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Above: Kenneth Callahan (American, born 1906), Fossil Cany on, 1959, watercolor, gouache on paper, mounted on masonite, 26-5/16" x 52". Valparaiso University Art Collections,
Sloan Fund Purchase, S 62.1
Cover: Mark Tobey (American, 1890-1976), D evoted, 1970,
acquatint, Transitions (Suite of 7), 32/75, 12-7/16" x 9-9/16".

Valparaiso University Art Collections, University Fund Purchase, 81.8
For Mark Tobey and Kenneth Callahan, ultimate reality
is indivisible. Devoted radiantly pulsates with an overall constancy of dark and light micro- or macroscopic units. Fossil
Cany on joins earth, animals, and man to express something
of "the truth which I feel lies in the interrelationship of all
things in life-rocks, people, ideas, animals, galaxies, atomswhich all stem from one Godhead and which are all part of
that Godhead, inevitable, interrelated." (Callahan) RHWB
T he Cresset

IN LUCE TUA
Com ment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

Gay Rights, Gay Wrongs
People can live with change. Indeed, they have no
choice in the matter, since change is the only universal
law of history. If there is a part of all of us that wishes
that things would always remain the same, there is also
in most of us a reality principle that recognizes that it
cannot be so. What people cannot live with-what they
will instinctively rebel against-is a fundamental revaluation of their moral universe. It is precisely that sort
of fundamental revaluation that the gay rights movement has set out in pursuit of, and it is that, we think,
which guarantees its failure.
Not that views on this issue remain as they were; they
do not, and the changes have often been for the better.
Much of the pathological anti-homosexuality that those
of us over 40 grew up with has disappeared. There is no
longer open season for gay-bashing, and most people
are willing to concede that what goes on in private between consenting adults is no business of the state. Even
those of us for whom homosexual behavior is abhorrent
generally agree that the gay subculture should be free
to carry on without fear of harassment from the police
or from the vigilantes of the straight world. As a society,
we distinguish better than we used to between that which
we consider sinful or unnatural and that which we brand
as criminal. (For a sympathetic understanding of the
gay world, we recommend to our readers John Steven
Paul's Theatre column elsewhere in this issue.)
But all this is no longer what the gay rights movement
considers itself to be about. It has long since gone beyond claiming the right to be let alone. It now demands
legitimacy- not just in the eyes of the law, but in moral
and cultural terms as well. When homosexual groups
denounce "homophobia," they have in mind not simply
that habit of mind virulently anti-gay or unwilling to
do away with restrictions on gays in employment, housing, and other public goods; they mean any pattern of
thought that will not accept homosexuality as an expression of sexual orientation no less legitimate or normal than heterosexuality. Yesterday's gays asked not to
be interfered with or made to suffer damages for their
private behavior; today's demand public acceptance of
their homosexual preferences.
Consider, to begin with, the ca e of the niver al
Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, a
church body whose ecclesiological organizing principle
is homosexuality. The UFMCC, which claim to have
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109,000 members, has precipitated a crisis of conscience
among liberal church people by applying for membership in the National Council of Churches. The NCC is
currently pondering whether it can accept into membership a church that affirms sexual relations between people of the same sex as a gift of God and that insists that
there is no incompatibility between a homosexual "lifestyle" and the Christian faith. (The NCC has postponed
any decision until November, 1983 at the earliest; it
appears to be tom between what it instinctively wants to
do and what prudence warns that it ought to do.)
The UFMCC is an extreme but not unique phenomenon. Most major denominations-Lutherans and Roman Catholics included-now contain within their
ranks organized groups of homosexuals whose purpose
is to persuade their various churches to remove their
strictures against homosexual behavior and to acknowledge the legitimacy of gay relationships and practices.
Gay Christians dismiss traditional church prohibitions
and condemnations of homosexual behavior as instances
of "bigotry" and "intolerance" that need to be repented
of and replaced by a more accepting and inclusive sexual ethic.
As in the religious world, so also in secular matters.
For some time now, gays in various communities, notably San Francisco (where homosexuals make up an
estimated 15 to 20 per cent of the population) have
argued that sex education in the chool mu t includ
discussion of homosexual practice in uch a way a to
present them as an equally valid and entirely normal
alternative to heterosexual relationship . More rec ntly,
gays have been pressing for recognition of homo xual
"family rights." San Franci co again i in th vanguard.
The city board of sup rvi or there r c ntl approv d a
measure that would grant gay partn r of city mploy
the same benefits that apply to h t ro ual pou
city worker . In order to qualify for b n fit - h alth
care being the mo t ignificant-coupl n t r lat d by
blood or marriage ne d imply pay a f and
ar that
they "share the common n e ari of lif ." Th
sure appli to unmarri d h t ro xual
but everyone conced that th imp tu f r th
came from the gay communit . h pr
i legal , but it i obviou that pa a
f
implie ocial and moral 1 gitima
of ri hts under th law. Ga c uplin
problematic and no mor to be r mark
o exual union.

If it is true that the tendency to homosexuality lies outside the realm of choice, Christians
can hardly attach moral condemnation to it. People cannot be blamed for what they cannot help.

For Christians, the homosexual problem is at once
simple and complex. On the one hand, the moral is ue
could hardly be more straightforward: both the biblical
witness and the teaching tradition of the church unequivocally depict homosexual behavior as an abomination. Some apologists for homosexuality have engaged
in tortured reinterpretations of scripture and tradition
in order to make them say something other than what
they do, but those exercises can only be persuasive to
those who take neither scripture nor tradition seriously.
Even for those unimpressed with the orthodox tradition, it must be difficult to see homosexual behavior as
anything other than a denial of the created order. If
there is anything in human practice that would, in the
light of nature, belong to the category of the unnatural,
it is sexual relations between members of the same sex.
Only those who would deny any pattern or coherence
in creation could avoid the inference that homosexuality contradicts the natural order of things. It is no
coincidence that radical feminists (those who dream of
an androgynous social order) have lent support to the
gay revolution: both groups have an unresolvable
quarrel with nature over their sexual identities.
But if Christians need not agonize endlessly over the
moral nature of homosexual behavior, that is only the
beginning of their necessary grappling with the problem. Important distinctions and qualifications remain
to be made. There is, in the first instance, the crucial
difference between inclination and practice. We still
lack definitive knowledge of the causes of homosexuality. Some locate it in genetic predisposition, some in
psychological reactions to events and relationships in
childhood development, some in an uncertain combination of nature and nurture. The gay phenomenon is
still hedged about with a good deal of mystery. Whatever the precise reasons for the condition, it seems clear
that certain people have a "natural" tendency to an
"unnatural" attraction. (Gay rights activists, of course,
deny that there is anything contrary to nature or the
will of God in homosexual behavior; for them there is
no gay "problem" requiring solution, except in the
straight world's inability to accept gay preferences.)
If it is true that the tendency to homosexuality lies
outside the realm of choice, Christians can hardly attach moral condemnation to it. People cannot be blamed
for what they cannot help. Indeed, homosexuals should
have our deepest sympathy and compassion, for their
unwilled inclination to wrongful behavior means that
they must, if they would remain faithful to the JudaeoChristian sexual ethic, resign themselves to a celibate
existence. That is a heavy price to have to pay for what
must seem to gay Christians and Jews a cruel jest of God.
Those of us in the Christian community who are not
gay owe those who are our understanding rather than
4

our cen ure, and if w mu t c ntinu to rej t homoexual beha ior without qualification w mu t al o
learn to accept without re rve our broth r and ister
in Chri t for whom h tero exual relation may never be
po sible.
And when those who are gay uccumb to exual temptation, we must struggle not to make more of that in
than it deserves. Attempts to arrange sins in rank order
or to weigh them according to relative gravity ought
normally to be avoided (would three instances of sloth
outweigh two of gluttony?), but it does seem that our
condemnation of homosexual behavior-as with our
condemnation of most sexual misdeeds-is often out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense. What the
fashionable world makes too little of, Christians often
make too much of. Christians should not turn a blind
eye to homosexual sin, but neither should they become
unduly preoccupied with it. Flagrant indulgence in
homosexual behavior, of course, should no more be
ignored or played down than should sexual promiscuity
of any kind. (It might be noted in this connection that
while promiscuity is hardly reserved to gays, it does
occur in the gay sub-culture with such frequency as
virtually to make it a norm there. There is reason, in
other words, to find the world of gay bars and health
clubs morally objectionable quite aside from the particular nature of the sexual offenses that occur within it.)
If for Christians the moral dimensions of the homosexual question contain certain ambiguities, those are
only compounded when we move to the realm of social
norms and public policy. It is not possible in a pluralistic society for Christians to write all their moral preferences into the penal code. Even if it were possible, it
would not be desirable. Christians understand adultery,
for example, to be a violation of the law of God, but few
of us would want to return to the situation where it also
constituted a violation of the laws of the state. And whatever it might do to elevate the moral tone of our society,
most of us are not inclined to want to reinstate laws requiring sabbath observance. If every sin were to be
made a crime, our judicial system would at once collapse
under the overload. It therefore does not necessarily
follow that Christians will want to see their moral rejection of homosexuality embodied in sodomy laws. As
already noted, private behavior affecting only those
indulging in it should normally remain a private matter.
But it is precisely here that things get most complicated. What the rhetoric over gay rights so often obscures is that the private rights of homosexuals have
never been under threat less than they are today. Only
a handful of ineffectual zealots wants to regulate an one's private morals or to smoke out gays in order to
persecute or discriminate against them in job hou ing
education, or anything else. Few Americans de ire
The Cresset

Simple humanity requires that we treat gays with dignity and compassion, but that does not mean
that we must acknowledge their claims of legitimacy for homosexual practices and relationships.

either to interfere in gays' private sexual activities or to
subject them to intrusive interrogations into their sexual preferences in order to deprive them of public benefits. American society today in effect offers gays a tacit
agreement: keep your homosexual activities private
and discreet and you will be left alone. We may not
approve of your behavior but we will ignore it if you do
not make a public issue of it.
But for advocates of gay pride that agreement, which
in the days of intense anti-homosexual discrimination
would have been welcomed, is no longer acceptable. A
generation of liberation movements and a revolution in
sexual morality have combined to bring gays storming
out of the closet in insistent pursuit of overt public acceptance of homosexual behavior. Their demand is not
for the rights of privacy but for explicit acknowledgement of their social and moral legitimacy. No one talks
any more, except in nostalgia, of the love that dare not
speak its name.
Thus the emergence in recent years of gay rights as a
public issue stems not from any recrudescence of gaybaiting but from a newly militant mood among gays
which insists that society accept them on their own terms
and that the powers of the state be used to guarantee that
acceptance. Gay rights proposals typically call for a flat
prohibition against distinctions among persons on the
basis of sexual preference. Under the standard gay
rights ordinance, for example, no individual may refuse to hire a homosexual otherwise qualified for a position regardless of how flagrant or unrestrained the gay's
flaunting of his sexual propensities. Note that such a
provision goes beyond protecting from persecution by
fanatical anti-homosexuals gays who keep their sexual
proclivities private: that could be accomplished simply
by forbidding inquiries into sexual preference except
in situations where such inquiries could be shown to be
· relevant (and those rules could be drawn quite strictly).
There is, we concede, a legitimate case to be made on
grounds of individual rights for the more inclusive prohibition. What holds some of us back from unqualified
support for that position is the moral logic it suggests.
Civil rights laws involving racial and ethnic minorities
rest on moral imperatives: it is right and necessary for
government to protect minorities because discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity has no moral justification. That reasoning does not necessarily apply to
the case of gay rights. It is at least arguable that such
disputes over social norms should be determined by the
free play of public attitudes, and not by the imposition
of government proscriptions. (First Amendment safeguards would of course protect advocacy of gay rights
under any circumstances, but that is not here under
dispute.)
However we finally decide these matter of public
January, 1983

policy-and they are anything but simple to sort outit is necessary to maintain certain distinctions. Civilized
existence in a pluralistic society requires a spirit of liveand-let-live; tolerance of deviant behavior is necessary
if we are to live together in a state short of perpetual
civil war. But tolerance loses any claim to virtue if it
becomes defined as the absence of moral judgment or
choice. Tolerance is a proximate, not ultimate value,
and it should never be elevated higher than it deserves
or used as an excuse for moral evasion.
Simple humanity requires that we treat gays with dignity and compassion; there can be no justification for
demeaning them as human beings. But that does not
mean that we must acknowledge their claims of legitimacy for homosexual practices and relationships. (A
friend, unfailingly liberal in all matters, once confessed
that she could only remain truly liberal on gay rights
if she did not think too carefully about what it was that
homosexuals did.) For Christians, permissible sexual
relationships must remain conformed to the intentions
of the Creator, and the compelling image in the creation
story of man and woman become one flesh remains our
normative guide. It may not be our place to impose that
norm on society, but it must remain the standard by
which our moral judgments on this vexed topic stay
fixed.

••
••

where foxes sleep
deep inside the burrow
the foxes dream grey cold
dreams
their pointed faces
stare straight ahead
their tipped ear
hear the snow banking
on their den
they do not ee the light
from our window
or smell wood moke
the foxe sleep cold
and deep in now
their eyes fixed on om ilent ign
the wind hake th hou
branch
crap
wh re our ye
from a blu -whit land
wh re foxe l

wind w

J. T. Ledbetter
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Life as Gift and Task
Critical Reflections on the Nuclear Dilemma
Steven Schroeder
(Editor's Note: In November, 1982, The Cresset published
Gilbert C. Meilaender, Jr. 's, "Christians and the uclear
Dilemma: An Unfashionable View." Given the critical and
highly controversial nature of this topic, we are pleased to
present Mr. Schroeder's essay, which approaches the subject
from a quite different perspective. )

Since July 16, 1945, when the first atomic bomb was
detonated near Alamogordo, New Mexico, humankind
has lived with nuclear weapons, and we have lived with
a growing sense of uniqueness, a sense that ours is a time
in which the fate of the earth, our fate, will be decided.
The explosion of the international anti-nuclear movement, the popularity of Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the
Earth, and a vantage point less than twenty miles from
Pantex-the final assembly point for nuclear weapons
produced in the United States-make this an appropriate time and place for reflection on the ethical significance of the nuclear arms race.
I take Schell's work, which is a masterful compilation
of probable consequences of nuclear war and reflections
on the rationality of continued preparation for it, as a
point of departure. Like most masterful compilations, it
raises questions that it simply cannot address adequately
at the same time that it provides a vantage point from
which to explore those questions in new and almost
certainly more effective ways. I take the explosion of the
anti-nuclear movement both as a sign of hope and as an
opportunity for political transformation that is unquestionably significant from a theological and ethical perspective. And I take the proximity of Pantex as a shadow
under which all of us live and work, a shadow that all of
us have had a hand in creating and perpetuating.
The growing sense of uniqueness eloquently
expounded by Schell and increasingly felt by people in
the peace movement carries a conviction of chosenness
or vocation that sets this generation apart from others.
That conviction is a mixed blessing, one that inspires
us even as it threatens to direct our attention away from

Steven Schroeder is a 1974 graduate of Christ College in
Valparaiso University. He just received his Ph.D. in Ethics
and Society from the University of Chicago Divinity School.
He presently serves as Director of Northwest Texas Clergy
and Laity Concerned located in Amarillo, which, as he notes,
is less than twenty miles distant from Pantex, the final assembly
point for nuclear warheads in the US. arsenal.
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the heart of th probl m at hand. The mo t immediate
danger i that we will becom
o con inced of our
uniquene that we will mi
ome obviou and important le ons from the pa t.
It i ignificant, I think, that the fir t nuclear explosion, code-named Trinity, took place in a de ert plain.
called Jornada del Muerto, the Journey of Death. That
explosion, which set the current age of nuclear weaponry in motion, took place within a journey of death recognized by Spanish settlers centuries before; it was part
of the same journey. Trinity does not so much pose a
new problem as it poses an ancient problem, a problem
as old as humankind, in a new way.
This is not to dismiss Einstein's observation that, with
the advent of nuclear weapons, everything changed except our way of thinking. Einstein was well aware of the
fact that the model of a truly radical "scientific" revolution is the Copernican revolution, in which-while the
physical universe did ndt change-the whole world was
made new by a new way of seeing. Nothing changed
except our way of thinking: the sun and the earth continued to act as they always had, but we saw them with
new eyes, and they have never been the same. Einstein's
point, I think, was that because our way of thinking remained the same after Hiroshima, nothing changed. At
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we confronted a choice we
always confront, and, as always, we chose violence, destruction, and death.
The real revolution would have been to choose life.
As Schell makes clear, we are again confronted with that
choice in the madness of the nuclear arms race.
It is unfortunate that Schell draws too sharp a distinction between science and philosophy. He contrasts
the inexorable progress of science with the continual
circling back of philosophy. Science, he says, moves forward while philosophy continually asks the same questions. But the question posed by the unleashing of nuclear power is the same question posed over and over
again by philosophy and theology. The question takes
the form of death, and the philosophical enterprise
takes the form, as Montaigne tells us, of learning to die.
Schell almost inadvertently intertwines the search
for knowledge and the confrontation with death. In that,
he follows Montaigne and others, including the author
of one of the creation accounts in Genesis. His mistake,
I think, lie in his failure to acknowledge the conscious
and explicit connection. Einstein stands in the tradition
of philosophers just as surely as he stands in any independent "scientific" tradition, and his new way of lookThe Cresset

Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the logical consequences of war. War did not become absurd
or irrational with the advent of nuclear weapons; it has always been absurd and irrational.

ing at th univ r r volutionizes philosophy just as
surely a it r volutionize physics. As a matter of fact,
Einstein joined Ru ell and others in recognizing that
the revolution in cience is not a revolution at all until
it is a re olution in philo ophy and human consciousness.
The ancient problem posed again at Trinity is the
problem of the Fall. In that event, according to the
Judaeo-Christian tradition, sin and death entered the
world and became ineradicable parts of human existence. Schell recognizes in part the significance of the
fact that death entered the world anew with the advent
of the nuclear age. Oppenheimer recognized it more
fully when he said that, at Trinity, scientists had tasted
of sin. The "second death" Schell discusses at length is
another version of the Fall. The elemental power of the
universe, which, as a creation of God, is "good," has
been turned to evil by humankind's seizure of a power
that does not rightly belong to it. Such power, of course,
is not power at all, but violence, which, as Schell shows,
is finally impotence.
Schell would have us distinguish sharply between
"death" as the death of individuals and "extinction" as
the death of humanity. This, I think, is a mistake.
Schell's definition of extinction as a human future that
can never become a human present applies just as well
to death. One cannot experience one's death except in
imagination, yet, since the Fall, death permeates all of
life. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, like Auschwitz and Dachau, reaffirm this with an urgency that should stir us to
action. We cannot remove the possibility of death from
life, but we can confront it in ways that make our life
more fully human.
Some of these ways have been explored by theologians
and philosophers in the "pre-nuclear" world. This is not
to deny the significance of our recent experience, but I
think it important to see the change as part of a progression toward "total war," to borrow Bonhoeffer's term,
rather than as a change that entered suddenly and full
blown into the world with the first nuclear explosion.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the madness of the nuclear
arms race, are the logical-albeit extreme-consequences of war. War did not become absurd or irrational
with the advent of nuclear weapons; it has always been
absurd and irrational. Before Hiroshima and agasaki ,
we may have been able to survive such insanity, but
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are themselves evidence that
the survival was only temporary. Our insanity has
driven us unswervingly toward destruction.
In his lectures on the Fall, written early in the madne s of Hitler's Germany, Dietrich Bonhoeffer decribes our ituation "in the middle." We mu t keep in
mind, he tells us, that we hear of the beginning only in
the middle; we cannot tep out of the middle and tand

January 19&'3

in the beginning ourselves except by a lie. The same is
true of the end. We view both the beginning and the
end from the middle, from within history. This is true
for Bonhoeffer even though he says that the Church
speaks from the end: "Within the old world the Church
speaks of the new world .. . . The old world cannot take
pleasure in the Church because the Church speaks of its
end as though it had already happened-as though the
world had already been judged. The old world does
not like being regarded as dead." Yet that is exactly how
we must regard it if we are to survive.
Schell would have us take the perspective of future
generations as we seek to avert the End. Bonhoeffer
would have us take the human perspective of beings in
history as we assert that the end has already happened.
Bonhoeffer's description of our perspective is important for at least two reasons. First, it forces u to acknowledge that nuclear war is not just a threat; it is part
of a reality that is already killing us. Schell recognizes
some of the psychological symptoms of this slow death;
he doesn't mention the economic symptoms, the hunger
and suffering of those who have no access to the fruit of
the earth because that fruit is being expended in the
process of the earth's destruction. T.S. Eliot may have
been more correct than Schell thinks when he said that
the earth will end not with a bang but a whimper. It is
entirely possible that no one will pu h th button; we
may simply starve our elve to death by quand ring
our resources in arms production.
Second, it keeps us squarely in history a cnt1c of a
system and a world that is already dead. Paulo Fr ire
describes this as denunciation of an old ord r in th active annunciation of a new on . We mu t ex r i
tion in attempting to tak the p r pectiv of futur
erations. Even if ther ar to b no futur
n rati n ,
our task is the sa.me. We mu t build a truly human pr ent for it own sake, for the ak of b in truly human.
Sartre was correct I think, in a
that it w uld
make no difference if th r w r no
d and no h av n;
our ta k i to live a truly human lif now. B
was correct in eeing thi a th ignifi an
entrance into time and death . Th
generation . Our obligation i to
exi tenc regardle of th
i t n
tho gen ration .
Bonho ff er al o
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We are so panic stricken by the prospect of a future that is not ""given" that we lose sight
of the fact that the future has never been simply given. Life is a gih, but it is also a task.

edge of the limit on the edge there i constantly given
the possibility of an inner boundlessness. In the knowledge of the limit in the middle all existence ... is limited."
Bonhoeffer stresses our finitude and our creatureliness. In the Fall and in Trinity, we failed to acknowledge both. We experienced limits as boundaries or restraints against which to struggle rather than as grace
upon which to build. And in pushing against those restraints, we became, as the serpent promised, like gods.
Robert Oppenheimer quoted Krishna's statement frpm
the Bhagavadgi,ta to describe his experience of Trinity:
"Lo, I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds." In
becoming gods, we too have become death. Bonhoeffer
suggests that a transformation of consciousness, an experience of grace that enables us to live more fully human lives is the way out of that Fallenness. He, of course,
finds that experience in Redemption, God's entrance
into history. It is not too farfetched to expect that we
may find it in a similar way, in Freire's annunciation in
the midst of denunciation.
One of the important ways in which this happens is
through art. Schell joins Christopher Lasch in dismissing much of contemporary art as mere "spectacle."
Schell speaks of it as having dispensed with the common
world. But the best of contemporary art has not "dispensed" with the common world so much as it has come
to the realization that the common world is no longer
"given." More exactly, it has set out to bring us to the
realization that this "common world" has never been
"given." We have always played a role in creating it:
recent developments may have brought this role to consciousness. In that regard, at least, these are constructive
developments. Wallace Stevens captures the experience
of these developments in "Of Modern Poetry":
The poem of the mind in the act of finding
What will suffice. It has not always had
To find: the scene was set ; it repeated what
Was in the script.
Then the theatre was changed
To something else. Its past was a souvenir.
It has to be living, to learn the speech of the place.
It has to face the men of the time and to meet
The women of the time. It has to think about war
And it has to find what will suffice. It has
To construct a new stage. It has to be on that stage
And , like an insatiable actor, slowly and
With meditation, speak words that in the ear,
In the delicatest ear of the mind , repeat,
Exactly , that which it wants to hear, at the sound
Of which , an invisible audience listens ,
Not to the play , but to itself, expressed
In an emotion as of two people, as of two
Emotions becoming one. The actor is
A metaphysician in the dark , twanging
An instrument, twanging a wiry string that gives
Sounds passing through sudden rightnesses, wholly
Containing the mind , below which it cannot descend ,
Beyond which it has no will to rise.
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It mu t
Be the finding of a ati faction. and ma
Be of a man kating. a woma n danci ng. a w ma n
Combing. The poe m of the act of the mind

Our task is not o simple a merely acting a part. We
mu t also write the play con truct the tage, and be the
audience. That is con ciou creation of the "common
world" that binds us together.
We have always been mythmaker , makers of meaning; we must become more con cious of that role if we
are to survive. Where we have failed to become conscious, we experience what Schell fears: loss of meaning
and a radical break with the past. But in a very real
sense, that perceived break precedes nuclear war as its
cause rather than following it as an effect.
We are so panic stricken by the prospect of a future
that is not "given" that we lose sight of the fact that the
future has never been simply given. Life is a gift, no
doubt, but it is also a task. We are creatures, but we are
also creators, created in the image of God.
Perhaps even more important is the fact that our
panic creates the illusion that our present is "given" and
immutable. It isn't. We construct our world in our creative action. When we begin to perceive that world simply as given, we begin to become less human.
Schell's most distressing mistake, I think, is the assertion that "the law of fear" and "the law of love" lead to
the same thing. To believe that would be a fatal error.
The author of John's first epistle was correct, I think, in
saying that "perfect love casts out fear." The "law of
love" will help us announce a new order in the midst of
this madness. The "law of fear" will only lead us on toward final destruction.
Living "the law of fear" in this madness is a final destruction. It is literally the experience of hell in the
denial of humanity, in humanity's self-important denial
of itself.
Perfectly sane people, people who are our brothers
and sisters, fathers and mothers, friends and neighbors,
go to Pantex every day and assemble three or more
nuclear warheads to add to our arsenal. They go out of
a sense of duty, a sense of patriotism, a feeling of economic· necessity. All these things are grounded in fear,
fear of the Soviets, fear of diminished military prowess,
fear of a diminishing standard of living. That fear distorts the love of country, the love of freedom, the love
of family to a point at which they come to produce the
destruction of all.
If we accomplish nothing else, we must move from
fear to love, and we must do it in history, for the sake of
humanity-not the future of humanity, but its present.
We must accomplish that even if we are the last generation and even if our grandchildren will never be born.

••
••
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The Heart of the Reformation

Luther and the Fundamental Religious Experience

James Atkinson

In order to understand Martin Luther, one must
above all understand his overwhelming experience of
God reconciling man to Himself through the Gospel of
Christ, whereby Luther found peace with God and a
total explanation of this life and the certainty of joyous
life with God forever. Luther wagered his all on God,
and would not be silenced, unless proved wrong or
shown to be wrong. If modem man could but begin to
understand Luther's faith, a faith which throws itself
upon God, in life and in death, he would begin to understand Luther's significance for Christendom.
Luther never argued this, neither did he seek to prove
it on intellectual grounds: he simply proclaimed it. This
is the way of all such charismatic leaders. They all have
the prophetic gift of spiritual insight and vision, by
which they see and experience God, as well as the gift
of warm, compelling speech to communicate what they
have seen, felt, heard, and known. In some faint and
far-off way they all possess the insight and manner of
Jesus.
This way of knowing is not unrelated to the new approach of the scientist in the post-Einstein period. Newton and Descartes were analytical, i.e., they separated
themselves from the phenomena they examined, and
they observed, described, and related those aspects of
nature which they had separated out for closer study.
This process seemed necessary, and it yielded valid conclusions. Since Einstein, however, it is becoming clearer
that reality must be seen as a whole, and all of it organically related, none of it static but always dynamic: it
must be integrated. In other words, the scientist is no
longer an obseroer, but rather participant in the phenomena he observes and seeks to interpret. This is very
close to what Luther meant when he spoke of the experience of faith, still closer to what St. John meant when
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he spoke of revelation.
When Luther spoke of faith he was not explaining
Christian doctrine in objective terms, or giving a reasonable and impartial account of Christian faith and
morals. This he could well do when the occasion demanded it. No. He had been taken hold of by God and
his life was now hid with Christ in God. What he was
now talking about was not doctrine or morals on the
lines of a medieval schoolman observing such phenomena: he was now a partaker in God and a participant in
the life which God intended for man, which He had revealed in Jesus Christ and was now sustaining by the
Spirit of Truth. This was the way things were: this was
the explanation of the mystery of existence.
In some small way Luther was experiencing a glimpse
of the mind of God, if that is not too much to say. Faith
was the compelling power of God, given by God, and
it enabled Luther to see the divine meaning and purpose of life, as it had been revealed in Christ. He saw all
phenomena of time and space under God as a whole,
himself a partaker and prophetic exponent. In other
words, as St. John explains it, it is the gift of the Holy
Spirit, which comes and makes Hi abode with a man,
and which guides into all truth. It was such an experience, the very gift of God Him elf, which Luther m ant
by faith. This is no confessional or Lutheran empha i :
it is the very heartbeat of Christianity.
Melanchthon, in a preface to Luther' works, d scribed how Luther had always in i ted on the di tinction "between philosophy and th go pel , om thing
which is not in fact present in cotu , Thoma , and th ir
fellows." By "philosophy" Melanchthon m ant lo i al
ratiocination, purely peculative thinkin
arri d
through in a detached, obj ctive fram of mind: to tudy
with disinterest, as if th conclu ion did not aff t u .

When Christ strode across the stage of history, claiming to be far more than prophet or
sage, He set forth His claims to lordship in a manner unique among all founders of religion.

no real events, but fictions conceived to teach good behavior. "I Luther simply said, "He is not committed.'
He asked, "How can you deal with people who have no
firm belief to which you might appeal? You cannot refute them by scripture for it does not mean anything to
them.''2
It is of great interest to the thesis of the present e say
to recall that what Luther called "sincerity" is precisely
that quality of his mind which separated him from many
churchmen of his day, and which continues to the present day to be unacceptable to Roman Catholics who may
admire him, and who freely recognize the abuses of the
Church which he opposed and corrected. Those abuses,
they concede, needed to be reformed: they were in fact
reformed. They are all dead and gone. It is the author's
experience that the modern, educated, ecumenicallyminded Catholic agrees with Catholic moderates like
Cardinal Contarini, and is generally of the opinion that
the schism was both unfortunate and unnecessary. Luther, on the other hand, said repeatedly that the issue
was not about scandals and abuses, but about doctrine,
"propter Deum." Even the distinguished Catholic church
historian, Joseph Lortz, who more than any other man
brought Luther out of the ghetto where the Catholics
had banished him into the light of open and free examination, described this as Luther's "subjectivism." Lortz
could not reconcile subjectivism with the Catholic
Church. He argued that Luther was subconsciously
arguing on the false assumption that the transformation
in us, whereby we are justified, must be experienced
with such immediacy and emotion as to produce absolute certainty.
Here is a fundamental disagreement, a disagreement
which twentieth-century man can state in terms he can
understand and accept. Shall priority be given to intellectual understanding, or to subjective experience?
Properly understood, however, these should not be seen
as alternatives, or as mutually exclusive; rather, when a
man is taken hold of by God, he then learns the truth of
his real nature as a man, and his place in the world in
God's plan and purpose. This experience, described as
"being taken hold of by God," refers to a divine activity,
and is not, or rather is much more than, an intellectual
conviction which has been arrived at by normal intellectual activity.
A person who has undergone such an experience does
arrive at a perfectly sound intellectual position, in that
it provides an explanation of his state of being which
gives a satisfactory and complete interpretation of the
mystery of his human existence. It is an intellectual po1
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ition a much a the agno ti r
n th ath i t cupie open to all th nt1c1 m u h p opl make, and
with the intelle tual re pon ibilit not only of m ting
the objection of uch but of pr ing it ultimat poition in term they under tand. What i b ing argued
here i that while the man of faith may hold a ound intellectual po ition, that po ition i not arrivable at by
intellect alone, in the way one prove a theorem of Euclid or works out the di tance from the earth of a star.
In other words, it is created by God not fashioned by man.
The experience J e us underwent, through the long
testing years of the wilderne and wrestling with God,
is the perfect paradigm of what is being discussed here.
Lesser men, such as the Apostles, all shared this activity
in some way. Men described it as, "they had been with
Jesus." Charismatic leaders, such as St. Francis or Luther, all share in some small way this kind of experience
and the authority that goes wi~h it. It would cast a great
deal of light on our understanding of Luther to take a
brief look at this experience as portrayed by Jesus Christ.

The Invincible Lordship of Christ
In the Gospel narratives Jesus comes before men with
complete assurance and resolute authority. He is no
trained Rabbi, yet He challenges the scribes to combat
as if He needed neither institutional training nor public
position to support Him. He speaks with authority and
silences all who oppose Him on their own grounds. He
appears as sovereign over all authorities which stand in
His way. This invincible Lordship over every person
and situation is the expression of His mysterious nature
and power, and evokes astonishment and awe, enthusiasm or terror, as appropriate in each situation.
When Christ strode across the stage of history, claiming to be far more than prophet or sage, showing that
He was God's last Word in the redemption of man, saying that all men had need of Him and that He alone
could save and redeem, He set forth His claims in a
manner unique among all founders of religions. He
made His claims calmly and deliberately, as a matter of
course. He never explained Himself. He never reasoned His position. He simply announced it, and let
conviction steal into the hearts and minds of His followers as they heard His unique words and witnessed His
unique deeds. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."
This was always His manner. He never deigned to explain mysteries the curiosity of His disciples would fain
penetrate. He simply took for granted many things
modern men would long to discuss. His sayings proceeded from One who was in perpetual communion with
God, and therefore were uttered with a breath-taking
authority, quietly and assuredly, nothing doubting,
completely confident that they carried their own selfThe Cresset

For Luther, the true reading of the Bible is• continuous process of perpetually bringing
faith to birth: it is a constant renewal and re-creation of the spiritual understanding.

authenticating power and conviction.
It is important at this point to distinguish sharply between what the ew Testament describes as the work of
the Holy Spirit and what generally might be called
Illuminism or Inspiration. Luther in his biblical exegesis distinguished between the spirit and the letter, but
to draw this distinction clearly the guidance of the Holy
Spirit himself was necessary,
... for nobody understands these precepts unless it is given him from
above .... Therefore, they most sadly err who presume to interpret
the Holy Scriptures and the law of God by taking hold of th em by
their own understanding and study .3

The words, ideas, phrases of Scripture will not of themselves bring enlightenment and inward comprehension,
for what is uttered vocaliter needs to be understood vitaliter, in the heart and conscience. Luther argued that
the Holy Spirit is hidden in the letter of Scripture, since
the letter itself may proclaim only the Law, or the Wrath
of God, whereas the Holy Spirit conveys the word of
grace, the gospel.
This means, and this is a most happy and creative consequence, that the interpretation of scripture is not
something that is settled once for all, as a fixed body
of belief, or a received tradition. On the contrary, it is a
task that each and every man must assume for himself,
if the knowledge of the Word is not to sink once again to
the level of a dogmatic literalism. The true reading of
the Bible is a continuous process of perpetually bringing faith to birth: it is a constant renewal and re-creation
of the spiritual understanding. The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are
foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned (I Cor. 2:14).
Nevertheless, in stressing that such truth came only
from the Holy Spirit, Luther was acutely aware of the
dangers of the kind of Illuminism which the left wing
radicals and enthusiasts were energetically seeking to
project onto the Reformation. He repudiated vigorously
their claims to possess the direct operation of the Holy
Spirit, claims which, in his view, led to pride, fanaticism,
intolerance, and division. He emphasized the historical, objective witness of the divine revelation: it was the
Holy Spirit who unfolded its meaning to the penitent
and believing heart.
St. Paul had a similar experience and carried a similar power of authority. His writings contain more theology than all the writings of all the Fathers, but his
authority lay in that it pleased God who had separated
him from the womb (cf. Jeremiah) to call him by grace,
to reveal His Son in him, that he might preach Him
among the heathen. His authoritative theology derived
3

WA 57 . 185 ,20-186 ,9; AE 29 . 186.

January 1983

from his religious experience. Such a calling, such authority he deigned not to confirm by any human authority. He lived unto God, yet, as he put it in Galatians, it
was no longer Paul who lived but Christ who lived in
him, and the new life he now lived was by faith in the
Son of God.
So also it was with Athanasius. The place of Athanasius as a great religious leader has been overshadowed
by his immense theological and biblical learning which
ousted Arianism and paganism. It is as a theologian that
history remembers him in his fight for the Nicene orthodoxy, but first and foremost he was a man of the most
profound religious experience of Christ. His theology
was the outcrop of his religion. His inner fortress was
his spiritual intuition: he knew that his Savior and Redeemer was the God who made heaven and earth. It
was less his intellect than his unflinching and invincible
faith that convinced his day and generation. We should
ever recall that it was his spiritual strength that gave
that powerful personality such moral and mental vigor,
so that he was loved and respected even among the
heathen. Loyal to friends, generous to foes, he won
everybody by his irrepressible humor. In all his long
years of exile and banishment, hounded by the state
police, he was never once betrayed. Gregory and Epiphanius, Augustine and Cyril, Luther and Hooker, not to
mention moderns, all pay tribute to this saint. Even
Gibbon laid aside his "solemn sneer" to do homage to
Athanasius the Great. But it was his spiritual experience
of the Living Christ that was the fountain head of that
brilliant and irrefutable theology.

Strength from Communion with Christ
So it was with Augustine, Bernard, and Franci , with
Bunyan and Wesley, indeed with every great leader of
the Christian people. In every ca e, the leader' tr ngth,
whether of knowledge, or conviction , or ympathy, ha
always come from a direct communion with hri t, an
experience he has felt and known by him If and ommunicated to others in language gra p d by them and
in deeds recognized by them as havin th auth ntic
touch of Christ. All uch m n hav exp rien d that
strange warming of the h art, that p n tratin the
mists of doubt and uncertainty: and all who kn w th m
and experienced th ir mini try kn w that it had pl a d
God to reveal Chri t in them ; all who kn
th m ho
the word of the blind man heal d by Chri t,
I know, that, wher a I wa blind , now I
It was not otherwi with Luth r and with th R formation of whi h h wa th 1 ad r. Th pow r b hind
Luther wa th hatterin piritual
p ri n that r
haped him compl tely. Wh n
d t u h d Luth
that he realiz d that th r
th u ht h
11

The beginnings of the Reformation were experiential, not doctrinal. In fact it could be argued
that it was Luther's experience that opened up to him the Bible, church history, and doctrine.

create, no prayer he could offer, no deed he could perform which would bridge the painful gap between himself and God, but that God Himself had come all the
way in Christ, he said,
When I had realized this I felt myself absolutely born again. The
gates of paradise had been flung open and I had entered . There and
4
then the whole of scripture took on [a new] look to me ....

It was the old experience of all the saints, and yet it
was new, for in it was the creative power of God. There
was nothing new in Luther's experience, but as it was of
God, it made everything new. He knew that his life was
hid with Christ in God in spite of all evil, in spite of sin,
in spite of guilt. All his old dread of God, all his fears
and anxieties, all his doubts and uncertainties vanished
like the morning mist, and in their place arose a buoyant
and glad-hearted love of God, in answer to the love
which was kindled by the experience of what God had
revealed in Christ. This Luther experienced with a
compelling certainty, and this he proclaimed from pulpit, lectern, and desk. It had pleased God to reveal His
Son in him, and this experience, and its proclamation
in spoken and written word, was the sole foundation on
which the Reformation was built. From this experience
in Christ all Luther's theology derived: one could even
have the religious experience without the theology to
explain it.

Intellectual Speculation vs. Theology
The beginnings of the Reformation were expen:ential, not
doctrinal. In fact it could be argued that it was Luther's
experience that opened up to him the Bible, church history, and doctrine. He now saw what the Bible was about
and what God had done of pure love in Christ for us
men and our salvation. This vision opened up the whole
field of church history to him like a panorama from a
mountain top. It was this experience that made him
acutely aware of all the innovations and accretions which
had grown up over the centuries: transubstantiation,
infallibility, monasticism, indulgences, Mariolatry. It
was this experience which made him see that the theology of his day, the scholastic philosophy, was but an intellectual speculation on the nature of God and His
attributes and was no theology at all: it certainly was
not about the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.
The outcome of such intellectualism, apart from its
benefits of mental gymnastics, was to create an idol, a
figment of the human mind.
Doctrines, and their formal expression in theology,
are not the beginnings of things. They are formulations,
or even warehouses, where are stored centuries-old ex4
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p rien e of the on thin n
ful. Th r i alway at the
ba i of knowl dg wh th r of m n r thin
om eniti e and delicate relation hip of p r onalit with peronality. Logic and rea on h lp u from making errors,
but vi ion growth de lopm nt, and in ight are fired
when oul meet oul and hare the truth of experience. This i true of cientific inquiry and of aesthetic
and artistic growth: how much more true it i of religion.
We must be in touch with God to know Him in the true
sense of knowledge.
At the beginning of any real advance in religion there
must be a personal and intimate vision of God impressed
upon us as a religious experience which we know to be
true because we have felt it. The vision and experience
of the one is caught by the other: it is caught not taught.
The revival under Francis of Assisi spread in the way it
did because the fire burning in his heart kindled a flame
in the heart of every man, woman, and child who met
him. Luther headed the greatest reformation and revival of all time, because men felt and knew that he had
found a gracious God by a total trust in the grace of God
revealed to him in Christ Jesus. It was not the Augsburg
Confession, neither was it the Lutheran theology which
gave us the Reformation; it was the contagion of the religious experience Luther found in Christ. The expansion of that experience finds inadequate expression in
any confession or creed. Let us study that experience a
little more closely.
It is not to intellectual difficulties or doctrinal uncertainties that the beginnings of Luther's pilgrimage can
be traced, though it is true to say that when his religious
experience fulfilled itself, it resulted, in those areas
where it was accepted, in the collapse of the catholic culture, the breakdown of the catholic hierarchical structure, civil and ecclesiastical, from the local convent to
the authority of Rome, and the revision and reconstruction of th,e catholic doctrinal system. But the cause of
that upheaval lay elsewhere.
There is an old proverb that it is doubt that makes a
monk. This is true of Luther. There is not the slightest
trace of intellectual difficulty about doctrine during
Luther's great crisis. He had a brilliant university career
in the Faculty of Law, was lively, witty, happy, gifted
musically, and well set for a fine career in what we would
call the civil service. He gave the world up, he gave his
career up, to find one thing only: peace with God. Luther did the only thing he could do, and that was to go
into a monastery, the one place on earth where he could
give his whole life to save his soul. Almost everyone in
Luther's day would agree that that was the one and only
course, save, of course, men such as his common-sensed
father, or the witty and brilliant Erasmus, long disillusioned with monkery, for he had been through it all.
As Calvin was later to show, the very anthropocentric
The Cresset

To apprehend Luther's experience of faith is to know in essentials the theology of the Reformation,
for Luther's theology is but the doctrinal and intellectual formulation of his faith experience.

manner in which Luther expressed his en· de coeur
showed how wrongly he diagnosed his concern, how
hopeles was hi que t. He wondered when he would
ever do enough, make himself good enough, to reach a
gracious God and be found worthy of acceptance. God
heard hi prayer, but Luther was yet to learn the difference between God hean·ng prayer and God answen·ng
prayer.
Inside the monastery Luther devoted all his ability
with the utmost fervor to use to the uttermost the penitential system in order to make himself fit to be the receptacle of the grace of God. His obedience to his supervisor was absolute and rigorous. He sought the confessional to find peace of mind. He did not doubt the
place of the confessional, but when he could not experience the reality of it in his heart he thought that there
must be something wrong with him, some inadequacy
in his confession. He made full use of the sacraments,
and waited in vain for the mysterious, inexplicable experience of the grace he expected to flow from them.

Looking for Christ, Finding the Devil
He turned to all the other well-tried means: private
chastisements, fastings, vigils, prayer. He sought not
only to propitiate God by doing extra works, but to
compel God to remove from his soul the consciousness
of guilt. He failed: but it was himself he blamed, not the
methods. He persevered, in spite of the feeling of continuous failure. He later said, if ever a monk could have
got to heaven by monkery, I could! Surely, someone
will ask, had he never heard of the grace of God? We
must remember that spiritual and academic teachers
alike all taught that a man had to earn grace by doing
everything that was in him, "all that in him lay" was the
technical expression. This only sharpened Luther's
anguish, for how could he ever know that he had done
"all that in him lay"? Luther felt an overpowering sense
of God's presence, and as a mortal sinner this was felt as
a trembling awareness the sinner senses in the presence
of God the Holy One. He was like the moth longing for
the candle flame about to be destroyed by it. He said of
this experience that his confrontation with God was like
seeing the Devil: "When I looked for Christ it seemed
to me I saw the Devil."
Two long years of such anguish dragged on. His superiors believed him to be· a young saint: his fell ow
monks thought him the perfect monk. In his heart,
Luther knew otherwise. He thought that he was wrestling with his own sin: what he was really struggling with
was the religion of his times and of his church. He wa
probing it, testing it, examining it in all it depth ,
wrestling with the whole church's understanding of
grace: what he expected to be ources of comfort,
January, 1983

strength, and joy turned out to be springs of terror.
Luther was too brilliant, too percipient, too spiritual,
above all too deadly earnest, not to see that none of
these things was leading him to any solid ground on
which he could base his confidence and hopes for this
world and for eternity. He was much too honest to allow
himself to be persuaded otherwise. When his father confessor said to him that God was not angry with Luther,
that it was Luther who was angry with God, he still failed
to find assurance. "My confessor once told me after I
had submitted foolish things as sins (stulta peccata): 'You
are foolish; God does not bear you a grudge; you bear
Him a grudge. God is not angry with you; you are angry
with God.' A fine word which he spoke even before the
light of the Gospel shone forth. "5
It was Luther's work on the Bible which saved him,
in particular the discovery of the meaning of justification by faith as given in his exposition of Romans 1 :17.
As already noted, he was able to say after that discovery
that he felt born again, with the gates of Paradise now
open to him and the whole of Scripture beginning to
take on another look. It was this perspective, the entering in to Paradise, that gave Luther not only the insight
to interpret his own desperate spiritual struggle- and
this was liberation indeed- but also the immediate and
total awareness of the nature of the Go pel: to be set
right with God, to live at peace with Him, not by virtue
of his own righteousness, but by the sovereign grac of
God in Christ reconciling Hi world to Him If, to b
justified by faith.
By faith, he says. What then did Luther mean by faith?
To understand this term i not only to gra p the whol
significance of the Bible and what God's purpo in
Christ is and was, but it is to have the key to th R formation. To apprehend Luth r' exp rienc of faith, to
understand Luther's religiou experi nee i to know in
essentials the theology of the Reformation , for th th ology is but the doctrinal and int 11 ctual formulation
of that experience. To know th th olo
i not th
same thing as to have th xp ri nc . On can kn w th
theology and know nothing of th xp ri n : to kn w
the experience is to know both. That i why it i
important to under tand what Luth r m ant b faith.
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When we speak of II faith that throws itself upon God, which wagers everything upon Him,
we are not speaking of mere mystical abandonment: that is not at all what Luther meant.

inde d all th R form r , hri t fill the whole sphere
of God: th
do n t r ognize any theology which is
not a hri tolo
When w p ak of a faith that throws itself upon God,
which wager it all up n Him, we are not speaking of
mere my ti al abandonment: certainly Luther never
meant thi . Faith i th um total of our very life, as
Luther n v r tir d of aying. It actually is God within us,
welling up in all kind of activities. Faith receives all
from God, and i moved by Him to give its all to its
neighbor in love. Faith toward God and love towards
my neighbor constitute the great hinge round which all
religion and all ethics truly turn.
Surely, there is no faith where not love but its opposite appears and
shows itself. lthough the works of love do not !ustify and save, yet
they must follow as fruits and tokens of faith .1

This is what came to Luther and ended his long and
terrible struggle. He is unwearied in describing it:
whether in lecture room or pulpit, in book or letter,
even in conversation at table. The descriptions are extreme! y varied as far as their expressions go: sometimes
in medieval scholastic propositional form at a disputation; sometimes with texts from Psalms , Prophets, or
New Testament; sometimes in illustrations from the
feeding of his little robin on his window sill with the
breakfast crumbs, or from his little dog Rascal as he
stroked him and rubbed his ears; sometimes in phrases
from the medieval mystics; sometimes in his own
phrases of startling rugged beauty and originality. Always and always whether to pope or prince, priest or
people, the meaning is always the same and always
clear.
This conception of what Christianity means, what
Christ intended, what the true flavor of the authentic
religious experience really is, is the religious soul of the
Reformation. It contains within it, in that they naturally
issue from it, all the religious principles which inspired
it. We should not think of it as a dogma, or as Reformation theology, or even as evangelical theology. It is an
experience, it is the one thing needful, and that is why
it is of prime importance to see it first in these terms.
Nobody knew more theology than the young monk
Luther; nobody knew more or practised more devotedly and devoutly his religion. Yet he did not know God.
Luther's experience, the way he expressed it, the way
he thought through and beyond the theology and practice of his day finally to be confronted by the tark implicity and finality of Christ, is what made Luther relevant to all men of his day and what gives him his abiding
ignificance. Grant this thesis, and it will be een how
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relevant are the religious principles which issue from
that experience, and how disturbing they always are to
the religous establishment, Protestant and Catholic
alike.
But first and foremost, it is an experience, and the
phrases which set it forth are the descriptions of an
experience a soul has gone through . The thing itself is
beyond description, as all deep experiences are. It must
be felt and gone through to be known. The Reformation
started from this personal experience of the believing
Christian, which it declared to be the one elemental fact
in Christianity which could never be proved by argument, nor dissolved by criticism. It proclaimed the
great truth, which had been universally neglected
throughout the whole period of medieval theology by
everyone except the saintly Mystics, that in order to
know God, or speak one word of truth and sense about
Him, man must be in living touch with God Himself,
and God must first have spoken to him. Therein lay all
its freshness and appeal , all its originality and pow r.

Christ As the Center of Scripture
Luther made Christ the Redeemer the center of hi
writings just as He found Him to be the center of cripture. Without understanding who and what Christ i
neither Luther nor cripture can b prop rly appr ciated: Scripture and Luther are for ign ground to all
who do not recognize Christ a th ir Redeem r.
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When we speak of II faith that throws itself upon God, which wagers everything upon Him,
we are not speaking of mere mystical abandonment: that is not at all what Luther meant.
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they must follow as fruits and tokens of faith .1
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Eloquent Emotions
Men and Women and Tears

Dot Nuechterlein

Since I do not reside in Illinois it i possible that I
may never have the opportunity to ca t a ote for Jim
Thompson, that state's current governor. On the ba i of
a television appearance by him last ovember however,
I think I would like to.
Even those of you at a distance are no doubt aware of
what happened in the recent election contest between
Thompson and his challenger, Adlai Stevenson III.
Every one of the advance polls predicted a landslide
victory for the incumbent, yet the election turned out
to be so close-run a thing that neither side could claim
success for several days. (Even at this writing there is an
air of uncertainty hanging over the outcome, with the
possibility of a full-scale recount looming in the coming
months.)
Several days after the voting ended Thompson finally
went before the cameras and, guided by unofficial but
reasonably conclusive ballot counts, declared himself
the winner. I watched that broadcast with fascination,
for as he at long last had the opportunity to thank his
supporters and workers for their loyalty and labors on
his behalf, the man's voice broke and his composure
cracked. It was the nearest I have ever seen a major
political figure come to crying on camera.
Of course there was a reasonable explanation for this
incident. That news conference climaxed what had to
have been several days of anxiety and little sleep. A seesaw battle probably always creates hope/fear tensions
and self-doubts, along with gnawing reassessments and
possible recriminations over past strategies and policy
decisions. But to have that experience develop out of
previous sure-thing expectations must have been nearly
unbearable for the Thompson camp, and we can well
understand how the mix of relief and gratitude cm: Id
bring on a show of emotion.
What impressed me, though, was the Governor's
handling of this episode. He did not explain or excuse
himself; he was not embarrassed, nor did he try to hide
what was happening. He did not stop and "pull himself
together" before proceeding. Jim Thompson was a hu-
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man being acting lik one and h e let u in on th vulnerability inherent in the er aturely condition even as
he lived it.
Illinois femini t mounted a trong campaign last
year to try to ou t the Governor becau e of what they
felt was his betrayal of women's rights and his tepid
efforts on behalf of the ERA, whose defeat in that state
sealed its doom nationwide. I suggest, however, that
Thompson's display of feelings may have positive repercussions that in the long run will prove beneficial to
the cause of women.
How so? Well, no one in his/her right mind could
ever conceive of Big Jim as being weak, or wimpy (a
campaign issue associated with Stevenson), or soft, or
at all feminine in any way. Yet there he was being unabashedly emotional for all the world to see, and seeming to take it for granted as natural and normal behavior.
Would that his example might help to persuade others
of the folly of perceiving of males as eternally the cool,
dispassionate, rational sex, with females supposedly
ever verging on sentimentality or hysteria.
Every child's first act of life is to howl for breath, and
males as well as females spend large portions of their
first few years weeping and wailing. But in our culture
many (most?) boys learn early to repress this tendency
to tears. It is such a strong taboo that by adulthood it
seems to occur but rarely in public, and then only under
extreme provocation or duress. For males, crying is
irrational and infrequent, the sign of weakness and
lack of control.
Small wonder, then, that the fellow who does break
down in public is often thought badly of. (Remember
Ed Muskie? Some say he sacrificed his chance to be
President when his anger at a slur against his wife took
the form of public tears.) And it is therefore no surprise
that many men do not quite trust the capability or stability of women, those emotional creatures who are likely
to weep in a twinkling.
What these men do not seem to understand is that for
women, tears are not necessarily antithetical to selfcontrol. Crying is a multipurpose form of expression:
it might signify joy, sadness, anger, fatigue, gratitude,
or frustration. Item: has there ever been a newlycrowned beauty queen whose dewy eyes did not sparkle
as much as her tiara? Item: sex therapists indicate that a
woman brought to the brink of orgasm but left there
unfulfilled is likely to shed involuntary tears (and, by
The Cresset

In contrast to tears, anger is seldom therapeutic. While a show of temper can sometimes clear
the air, it is usually unpleasant and stressful for both the actor and the receiver/ observer.

the way, thi reaction i likely to be misinterpreted by
both her partner and her elf). Item: weeping over trifles
is a not uncommon re ponse to weariness . Item: I clearly
and painfully recall childhood or teenage instances of
being so furiou at a brother or a boyfriend that I could
do nothing but cry-and then being all the madder because I had no means other than tears to convey that
anger.
Even today I tend to get teary rather regularly. When
the hero gets the girl, when the orchestra plays a haunting refrain , when a weak one is hurt or exploited, when
someone is honored for a special achievement, even
when it's a player on the opposing team who hits a home
run-count on me to blow my nose and have difficulty
in speaking. And other women seem to say the same.
(In fact, it is almost as though the older we get the more
likely we are to choke up or glaze over.)
Here is the point: crying is so much a part of the female experience that we can do it and think at the same
time.
This fact is not recognized by the general public. For
example, opinion polls show that many citizens object
to the idea of having a woman become President of the
United States: they fear she might cry at cabinet meetings or in other high level situations. Well, so what?
Surely there are circumstances in this world that deserve
to be wept over. (Jesus did it, we may recall.) However,
it is undoubtedly not the tears per se, but the misconception that one who cries is falling apart, that causes
concern.
This is another illustration of how a female who competes in any traditionally male activity is expected to
conform to typically male behavior patterns. A recentlypublished guide for career women, written by a successful businesswoman, recommends that women become
"like men" as they move out into the world. She suggests
that her sisters must learn to transform their customary
emotional responses into anger, because "men can deal
with anger."
I disagree with that advice. There is a place in the
working world for woman's skill in handling all sorts of
emotions. Take my field, college teaching, as an example. It is not at all unusual for a student to come to a
professor's office and, upset over a grade or a personal
difficulty, to break into tears. Any number of male
teachers have told me that this experience makes them
feel awkward or uncomfortable, but never have I heard
a woman say that. (I am sure that some men don't mind
and some women do, but I have not happened to run
into them.)
In my opinion, tears can be a great boon in a counseling situation. Often the person trying desperately to
keep from crying is concentrating so hard on maintaining control that s/he cannot express or explain the unJanuary, 1983

derlying difficulty. Once that tension is broken, real
communication and genuine relief become possible.
The sufferer who cannot allow himself to reach that
state, and the helper whose main concern is to turn off
the faucet should the floods begin, are both handicapped in dealing with the problem at hand.
In contrast to tears, anger is seldom intrinsically therapeutic. While a show of temper can sometimes clear
the air, it is usually unpleasant and stressful for both the
actor and the receiver/observer. Rather than easing the
flow of mutual understanding between . individuals,
anger creates barriers to communication. Perhaps men
can "deal with" anger because it is commonly the sole
emotional outlet they are permitted to display openly;
unfortunately, though, a quiver stocked with poisontipped arrows alone, while marvelously useful for destruction, is woefully ineffective for amelioration.
No, I do not believe we women who are in public positions should follow the established male patterns. But
then, neither should they follow ours. It is simply not
true that if women could take charge of the world everything would be love and sunshine. The problems of life
are so complex that we must pool the insights and resources of all of us-of both sexes, of all races and nationalities, of all classes and conditions- if peace and

THE CRESSEY
The Question
Of the Ordination
Of Women
The Cresset wa plea ed to publi h th , po ition
papers of Theodore Jun?,kuntz and alter E. K ·II r
on "The Question of th
r<lination of\.\ m •n" in
its regular page .
In response to reader intere t, the Cre el i further
pleased to announce that r print of both po iti n
papers in one eight-page folio are n w a ailabl • for
congregational and pastoral nf •r n · ' tud ·.
Please accompany r print ord r · with a h " k
payable to th e Cressel and mail to :
The Cresset
Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383
Single Copy, 25¢
10 Copies for 20¢ Eech
100 CopHI• for 15¢ Eech

17

llll

From
The
Chapel
Lines Composed
A Few Miles Below
Fountains Abbey
On Revisiting
The Question
Of Faith
And Culture

INI

If there are sermons in stones and books in running
brooks, then our recent visit to the ruins of Fountains
Abbey probably spoke a more moving sermon to each of
you than anything your preacher can say in chapel today
on these more conventional, and apparently contradictory, texts from Paul and James, Matthew and Mark.
For us to travel through field and fountain, moor and
mountain to that secluded valley, then stroll up the
willowed stream to its spring, past the pool of swans
gliding like gauze and the pasture of sheep scattered
like foam, finally to ascend the towering foundations
of the Abbey antiphonally circled by seagulls, was for
many of us so deeply moving an aesthetic experience
that to say any more about it is to diminish it. Fountains
Abbey is one of the ancient monuments in England where
the tourists are reduced to whispering in the open air.
Their clicking cameras go quietly blind. Their souvenirs must become themselves. You can scarcely share
the experience with one another in the moment, much
less gasp it into postcards for the folks back home. You
had to be there.

Richard Lee

The Sweet Afterglow of the Aesthetic

We hold that a man is justified by faith
apart from the works of the law.
R omans 3:28
You see that a man is justified by works
and not by faith alone.
James 2:24
He who is not with me is against me.
Matthew 12:30a
He that is not against us is for us .
Mark 9:40

Richard Lee is Assocuzte Professor of Humanities
in Christ College of Valparaiso University and
D£rector of the University s Overseas Study Center
in Cambridge, England. Fountains A bbey, a Cistercian
monastery in North Yorkshire near York, was founded
December 27, 1132 and dissolved November 26, 1539.
The scenic rui"ns of the A bbey are p resently maintained
by a governmental department for the environment and
may soon pass to the care of The Nati"onal Trust.
January, 1983

Now, recollecting that sublime experience in the tranquility of chapel, we probably should be wary of leaving
Fountains Abbey in the sweet afterglow of the aesthetic.
Truth to tell, the Abbey is more beautiful today as a
misty and mossy ruin than ever it was as a working and
sweating Christian community, and it pre ent gr n
and pleasant decadence lends it a certain charm and
enchantment which the fathers and broth r who built
it never intended for it. In some ways tho e beautiful
ruins now obscure their faith as much a they rev al it,
and on some windy days I eem to hear th old monk
chanting their admonition to us-whi h if I tran lat
their Latin aright, come down to "To b autiful to b
true, too beautiful to be true." You
th y had in
mind the beauty of holine , not th h lin
of b auty.
Even more, however, we hould al o b wary of
turning such awe ome achiev ment f faith in f rm r
times into some terrible judgm nt upon ur
of faith today. Ther may b a tend n to
monument of medi val Chri tian cultur a
for faith in all tim . Th n th nl
that there ha been a

Hi f utur i final.
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To worry about how much faith we have been given is the first slippery step toward turning faith
itself into a work, and that way lies the only madness of which Christians alone are capable.

The mona tic life in e idence at the bb app ared
to many of us o perfectly fulfilled. early every a pect
of life eemed ubjected to the rule of faith right down
to the gothic gaol ne tled next to the chapel for the
more obstreperous monks. But it help our vi ion of the
Abbey if we remember that it was not the luminou tip
of a prevailing Christian culture but rather a fortre
built against a superstitious and pagan culture not
really so very different from our own. (I suspect some
of those gargoyles carved on the Abbey tower may have
covered some wagers with the old gods.) The difference
between the largely pre-Christian culture in which the
Abbey was begun and the largely post-Christian culture
in which we stand is perhaps only the difference of
nostalgias for different lost gods.

Going Against the Prevailing Culture
The robust faith in the living God which completed
Fountains Abbey was a faith which went against the prevailing culture of its time at the same time that it worked
with and through that culture to cleanse it of superstition and paganism and bring forth its most humane
possibilities. Do not be surprised that such a cultural
task is also the task of faith today and that new occasions
may teach new duties. There is no one, single universal
Christian culture for all times and places. There are
only the possibilities of each culture in each time and
place to be cleansed and claimed by the Christians
present.
Indeed, in our time that task may also mean a faithful
cleansing of the remnants of the vestigial Christian
cultures in which we may be placed. The cultural work
of faith is especially intricate and intriguing when
Christian culture is vanishing where it has not already
vanished. As the recent conclusion of the war in the
Falklands proved, even the Archbishop of Canterbury
may need to risk the wrath of the Prime Minister to
suggest God does not simply bless victory in battle,
even in a just cause, but mourns for the slain on all
sides and lays a special claim upon the victors to rebuild the peace. We may be less inclined to idealize the
medieval Christian past if we remember that then Mrs.
Thatcher may have held poor Pastor Runcie in irons,
or worse, for his witness of faith.
We hold that a person is justified by faith apart from the
works of the law. Our first text, from Paul, reminds us
that God turns each sinner upright by His grace. This
formulation for that uprighting grace of God further
reminds us that no works, not even the works of Christian culture, make any of us righteous. That uprighting
is God's work alone given to each of us in His gift of
faith. Christians in every age receive that gift as fully
20
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but impl act upon whate r faith th ha b n given.
To wor about faith i th fir t lipp ry t p toward
turning faith it elf into a work and that wa lie the
only madne of which Chri tian alone are capable.
In our time of cour e the good n w that men and
women ar 'ju tified b faith ' ha be ome omething
of a banality. To be ure the piritually di cerning in
all ages, indeed in everal different religions, knew that
no one work him elf worthy of any of God's gifts any
more than one works him elf worthy of his own birth.
Both being born and being "ju tified by faith" are profound surprises, even shocks, but the extraordinary
ordinariness of both is that it is obvious both happen
to us as gifts. For many in our time, however, to be
"justified by faith" is not so much gloriously obvious
as it is irrelevant. When one seeks nothing more than
sweetening the time and cultivating complacency, this
formulation of the good news is not so much old news
as it is no news.
The monks at the Abbey knew that the grace of God
cannot even be given away when no one is asking for it.
If that is the situation of many in our time, the faithful
will need to help the many ask better questions of their
lives before they rush in with the good news which is
no news until better questions are asked. In a postChristian culture perhaps less zeal is needed to speak
the good news which nearly everyone has heard- though
surely more zeal is needed to help men and women
become responsive to the word which they have heard.
And that cultivation of responsibility is a cultural task
which will probably not be done unless Christians do it.
You see that a person is justified by works and not by faith
alone. This is where our second text, from James, counsels the faithful that God's gift of uprighting faith is
never unaccompanied by works. Faith is not only an
inner disposition of the whole person, it is a public
event in space and time. Paul and James are really not
as much in conflict as our texts may appear if we remember that each emphasizes a different aspect of faith.
(Paul stresses that aspect of faith which is trusting our
lives to God for their uprightness while James stresses
that aspect of faith which is assent to the preaching of
Christ which makes that faith possible.) Perhaps Jesus
best adjudicates between Paul and James when we remember that He called the whole life of faith and works
discipleship. Certainly both Paul and James would be
puzzled, indeed horrified by an empty faith without
cultural questioning and creativity, and both are keen
that faith fill up and overflow with all that God gives
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There is plenty to do in every age to open closed minds, afflict sloth, stir imaginations,
steady wills, unmuddy choices, and restore personal and social responsibility to men and women.

Our
t th r fore, e pecially reminds us that
God i int r t d in mu h more than making each sinner
upri ht b faith. H i al o a intere ted in the fruits
of that faith which grow up in His world. The wholene of God i n
r for individuals isolated out of this
world-but for all of u together in this world toward
th world to come. From Paul to James we are reminded
that faith open u up to our work upon the cultural
vitalitie of our time to help bring forth their most
humane po ibiliti . For the faithful today that means
every work again t tho e cultural forces which leave
men and women relatively closed to God's gift of faith
and every work for tho e cultural forces which leave
men and women relatively open for His gift of faith.
There is plenty to do in every age to open closed minds,
afflict sloth, stir imaginations, steady wills, unmuddy
choices, and restore personal and social responsibility
to men and women. Indeed, the supply of that work
presently exceeds the demand of the faithful to do it.
(Now there's a pity, for those do the best cultural work
in the world who know there is no salvation in culture
by itself.)

Christianity and Cultural Pluralism
The cultural creativity of faith is, of course, both
complicated and enriched by God's gift of cultural
pluralism in our time. Christian cultural creativity
must be related, Christianly, to other cultural works
informed by other faiths. This task is not new to faith,
for our fathers and brothers in the faith were called to
work out their faith in Christ in relation to the Hebrew
culture in which He was pleased to define Himself, the
Greek and Roman culture in which He set his church
in the biblical age, and indeed the Norman English culture in which Fountains Abbey was built. But that task
may be new to the faithful today who have not yet fully
grasped their situation in a post-Christian age. And that
task is not only for clergymen and clergywomen - far
from it!- but for each of us in our ordinary callings of
marriage, family, leisure, study, charity, labor, citizenship, and the care of the earth.
He who is not with me is against me. Here our third
text, from Matthew, begins to offer us counsel. When
Jesus announces that whoever or whatever is not with
Him is against Him, He reminds us vividly that cultural vitalities are always grounded in one faith or
another. Our cultural choices therefore mu t be faithfully considered for what is not "with Him" and thu
"against Him." The uncomfortable truth is that our
Lord makes every cultural work a question of faith when
we would be happier if we could more conveniently
January, 1983

divide our lives into what is significant for faith and
what is neutral, or innocuous, or indifferent to faith.
If that were so, we could with clear conscience do what
we indeed do with guilty consciences, namely turn an
ever narrowing realm of the world which we consider
significant for faith over to salaried religious professionals and reserve an ever widening realm of the world
which we consider indifferent for faith to ourselves
for our worried pleasure. But Christians follow their
Lord wholly into one Kingdom over the world as it is
and as it is to come. He does not come to us divided to
induce schizophrenia or sleep.
However, neither does our Lord make our cultural
choices religiously picayune, or moralizing, or pietistic. There are times to say an uncompromising "no"
to certain cultural forces, but they are probably fewer
than some Christians imagine. In its context, our third
text is directed at whoever or whatever speaks against
the Holy Spirit. That which is not "for Him" is thus
"against Him" because it blasphemes. Indeed, Jesus
assures us that every sin will be forgiven , even sins
against Himself, but not sins against the Spirit. How
could there be forgiveness for that which denie faith
when righteousness is only given to faith?
Those cultural forces which blaspheme the Spirit
are forces which must be resolutely resi ted even unto
death, but-for the time being - tho e forces ar not
nearly so numerous among us a those force which may
only be in error, or unwise, or premature, or inad quate, or do about as much ill a they do good. To tho
cultural forces the faithful need not say "no." Chri tian
are often called to say "yes, but ... " and "w 11, mayb .. ."
The relationship of faith to every cultural vitality i
always provisional, and in some case more provi ional
than others. I note, for example, that non of you
m
inclined toward Fountain Abb y' ideal of m na ti
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The cultural work of faith proceeds piece by
piece, patiently putting each part in place.

celibacy, but I hope at least some of you remain committed to its cultural ideal of learning.
He that is not against us is for us. By now you know that
our fourth and final text, from Mark, does not contradict our third text. When our Lord announces that whoever or whatever "is not against us is for us," He alerts
us to the possibility, indeed the necessity, for faith to
make provisional alliances with those cultural vitalities
which may express faith, prepare the way for faith, or
even raise the questions for which faith is the answer.
In its context, our text refers to one who was doing the
healing works of Jesus without following Him, and ~ur
Lord was not opposed to such help toward the wholeness of the world from whatever source it came. Those
who follow Him in faith are also called to use every
cultural vitality which opens up the possibilities of
faith and which offers faith the opportunity to work
in the world.

No Christianity without Culture
There is no Christianity without culture as there is
no faith without works. Fountains Abbey was not built
without the cultural vitalities of the aspirations of
Norman England, the loyal ties of masons to the highest
standards of their guilds, the artistic readiness of Flemish
weavers for the wool of the Abbey's sheep, the quest for
wholeness and holiness of thousands of monks, and even
the pardonable pride of a succession of worldly wise
abbots who evidently were shrewd at making a place for
prayer and study secure by means of some hard trading.
(You did expect me to say a kind word for administrators, didn't you?) Any of us should do as well as they
did at his own cultural creativity today, and we all
would be most blessed as a generation if our faithful
cultural creativity made the rest of the world nervous
that it might be missing something.
Take one last look at your experience of Fountains
Abbey. Some of the stones are scattered. They may remind us that the cultural work of faith proceeds piece
by piece, patiently putting each part in place. The
chapel, cloisters, and tower artfully blend several different architectural styles. They may remind us that
the cultural work of faith proceeds over many generations, preserving their particularity while seeking their
unity. The Abbey is now in ruins. Those ruins may
remind us that every cultural work of faith is provisional. But the ruins are now visited by thousands of
tourists who are almost transfigured into pilgrims. That
experience could remind you that no work of faith is
ever lost to God, and if He can make those stones speak
He also may be able to do something beautiful with
us.Amen.
Cl
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where foxes bark
the e hill ring with m axe
and the ringing echoe down
the frozen hills
where foxe bark
in the blue ice and mi t hovering
on the pond
the wood I stack in neat piles
as if to pass inspection
and busy myself with counting
Spruce and Balsam
watching for harder wood
my axe glinting against the bark
and the mist rises up the gullies
touching the lower branches
where snow balances
and far below the windows of the house
glow like eyes
and the snow muffles all sound
gives up no hint of warmth or love
or sign of things to come
as if this hill were floating in the mist
and all the stacked wood and bright axes
were phantoms
disappearing in the snow
J. T. Ledbetter

On the Ferry
Perhaps the passengers, who, in unison,
Lean over the rail, are looking for
That Icarus splash, the brief flurry
Of wings turning speck in the sea eye.
Perhaps they remember, as I do,
Some floating time, cotton wings
And the stepping into space
With children who leave their names in air.
Perhaps when Aaron, my son, pushes
Against the safety grate and tumbles
Out where I have to follow,
Knowing this is two of us to drown,
My clumsy legs will kick
So many fatherly, useless times,
Speculating yet that I can save him
From that swimming he must do.

Gary Fincke
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Completing the Learning Cycle
The Place of Professional
Schools in the University

David S. Luecke
The 19 0 are a time of shifting focus in higher education. The shift was reflected symbolically in the 1980
registration figures for Valparaiso University. That year
the College of Arts and Sciences became a minority division ofthe University. For the first time, its enrollment
showed up as less than half the total. The student bodies
of the professional divisions-Business, Engineering,
Law, and Nursing-became the dominant presence in
the University.
Valparaiso University is of course not unique in witnessing the trend toward greater student interest in
studies with a professional focus. Around the country,
engineering and business undergraduate enrollments
burgeoned in the 1970s. Law schools expanded. So did
other applied specialities, such as journalism. The new
pattern of student preferences represented an enrollment shift, not an add-on. On most campuses, there
has been a decline in the number of students majoring
in the central liberal arts areas of the humanities , social
sciences, and natural sciences.
That enrollment patterns are different is now readily
apparent to the higher education community. So are
some of the implications. New faculty positions in the
traditional liberal arts have all but disappeared, while
many professional programs show a touch of desperation in their search for qualified instructors. Pressures
on compensation patterns are an inevitable result. There
is plenty of reason to see the shift as painful, especially
from a liberal arts perspective.
But from the perspective of a university's overall
dedication to the learning process, there is reason to
see a beneficial implication. Expressing what that might
be is the present intent.
Professional programs have an educational contribution to make in a liberal arts environment beyond
maintaining enrollment levels and feeding general
education courses. They can create a productive tension

that gets to the heart of the educational enterprise, as
pursued by all participants, not just their own.
One way to formulate that beneficial tension is presented as well as anywhere in a Valparais9 Univer ity
statement about its character:
The aim of liberal education is to understand reality and render
it intelligible. It does this through the development of arts and disciplines which enable a person to understand our cu ltural heritag
and to investigate social and natural phenomena.... The aim of
professional education is to enable a person to intervene in particular situations on behalf of clients, who may be individual , group ,
or communities. Thus profes ional education tend to focu on acti n
and its consequences. . . Professional faculty and their tudent
are purposive and competency oriented . They impart these qualiti
to the whole University . ( Valparaiso University elf tudy , 1 77 .
pp. 24-25 .)

The most fundamental contribution of th incr a in
professional presence in higher education i an mphasis on defined purpose and competenc . To a prof ionoriented faculty the value of that mpha i , of cour
seems obvious. Energetic attention to working ut
those definitions follow in intent and practic .

Receiving Questions with Impatience
traditi nal lib ral

campu pre
an irritant.
ritant all th
David S. Luecke is Professor of Administrative Sciences at
Valparaiso University. He holds a Ph.D. in Organizational
Behavior from Washington University of St. Louis, where he
also taught and served as Vice-Chancellor for University
Services. He has published a number of articles, including
"Church Leadership: A Management Perspective " in the
ovember, 1981 Cresset.
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Learning is a cycle that starts with experience and, one way or another, finds its way back to
experience. Its purposeful pursuit is best done by seeing that each stage is well looked after.

helping bu ine
tudent under tand wh the are
expected to put o much of their effort into learning
seemingly impractical things, as well a wh the pend
so much of their time (half of the curriculum) in general
education courses. It can perhaps al o be useful on the
other hand, for describing how the interests and perspectives of profession-oriented students fit productively into the educational give-and-take of a university community.
Kolb suggests that the learning process is really a
four-stage cycle. It starts with experiences, which are
translated into concepts, which in turn are u ed as
guides in the choice of new experiences. He calls the
four stages Concrete Experience, which leads to Reflective Observation, on the basis of which Abstract
Conceptualizing is developed. That leads on to Active
Experimentation, testing concepts in new situations.
Such guided experimentation produces new experiences
and a repetition of the cycle. This sort of scheme is not
unique in learning theory.
Where the model gets more interesting is in Kolb's
suggestion that individuals develop differing abilities
and interests in each of these stages. Those result in
distinctive learning styles. Some people are most comfortable dwelling on reflections from their experience,
concentrating on new observations. Others have minds
that excel in assimilating disparate observations into
coherent theories, but that lose interest in deducing
practical applications from their theories. Still others
characteristically concentrate mostly on that next stage,
accepting concepts and then experimenting with their
implications. Finally, some remain closely oriented to
handling concrete experience and reach back in the
cycle for whatever has been found useful.
In his research Kolb developed a Learning-Style Inventory designed to measure an individual's strengths
and weaknesses in these stages of the learning cycle.
The Inventory involves forced self-choice of adjectives
the individual would use to describe his or her own
characteristic way of learning. Use of the inventory
among a number of respondents demonstrates some revealing differences in learning style.
In a study of practicing managers and graduate students of management, Kolb found a particularly interestingrelationship between the inventory-determined
learning styles and the undergraduate majors of the
respondents. 'Those who had a relatively strong emphasis on the first part of the cycle-reflection on experience-tended to have majored in history, political
science, English, or psychology. Kolb called them
divergers. Assimilators emphasized the next stage of
theory building, and those who had that strength tended
to come from college majors in economics, mathematics, chemistry, and physics. Engineering and nursing
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w re th dominant major f r tho
con ergent thinkin mo in from
to active
nd r
majoc ~nd
mpha i on experim ntation and con r t
nc ,
which Kolb called th accomm dator t le.
That th e differing learnin
t 1
acad mic
experience are a ociated i really not urpn mg.
Intuitive categorization of tudent p r onalitie oberved in the variou major would likely result in a
similar differentiation. The tatistical descriptions
would undoubtedly be even more pronounced if a learning-style inventory were admini tered to a total campus
population. Such de cription leave a basic question.
Do people choose fields that are consistent with their
learning style or is their learning style shaped by their
academic experience? Kolb guesses it is a combination
of the two factors.
For present purposes, it is revealing to note some
common characteristics of the majors associated with
Kolb's learning styles. Those clustered in the first two
stages of the cycle are found in the traditional liberal
arts. Those in the second half are in professional programs. Whatever else separates the two types of education, they tend to deal with different learning styles.

What Uses of a Descriptive Model?
What use is this descriptive model of something so
much a part of a university's special character? In itself the discussion to this point is a reflection of the
beginning stages of the learning cycle. What are the
implications for the finishing stages of experimenting
with the concept and using it to select new experiences?
The formulation of that question carries within itself
a major assumption. The best learning moves thoroughly
through all four stages. Learning is a cycle that starts
with experience and, one way or. another, finds its way
back to experience. Its purposeful pursuit is best done
by seeing that each stage along the way is well looked
after.
One of the implications of the learning cycle is the
suggestion that a dominant learning style is both a
strength and a weakness. The strength of being relatively adept at either observing, or conceptualizing, or
deducing, or applying insights is evident. But an individual or group which does one especially well also
tends to do the others less well. How will improvement
in overall learning most likely result? By getting help
with the weak stages, not just working harder on the
strong one.
Such an approach to improving learning skills finds
two applications in developing management problemsolving abilities. It could be recognized a having
The Cresset

Professional students usually feel a legitimate right to ask, How will this course or experience
make me a better engineer, or manager, or nurse? They deserve an answer to that question.
imilar appli ation in th ongoing development of
the edu ational lif of a university with the varying
strength -and weakne e -of it student body and
di ciplin .
A good introductory a ignment to participants gathered in a manag ment d velopment program is to divide
them into four group according to their dominant
learning tyle a roughly determined by the inventory. Then each group can be asked to design a supervisory setting that would best utilize the expected
strength and compen ate for the anticipated weaknesses of the group most opposite in style (divergers
design for convergers, accomodators for assimilators,
and vice versa). Each can also be asked to reflect on
how the opposite group is likely to perceive them and
react to their supervision.
Sharing these designs in general discussion often
brings several common experiences. One is greater
awareness that learning tasks really are perceived differently and that one's own emphasis can be constructively challenged. Another is that each style can lead
to productive contributions if it is sensitively stimulated and channeled. Most discussions also lead to a
greater interest in developing teams of colleagues who
can compensate for each other's weaknesses by having
all the styles well represented and energetically interacting. The exercise finds its most direct pay-off in the
management team building that can result.
A second application comes in the classroom with
undergraduates, especially those pursuing professional
studies. The model offers some help for dealing with
the tension that often arises between students and
faculty. Among other things, university faculty are
different from students in that they have unusually
developed strengths in one or more of the learning
stages that follow or precede concrete experience. It
is ultimately that difference which students are paying
for in their education. But those strengths can come
across as continual reminders of student learning style
weaknesses, particularly if the students see themselves
as action and experience oriented. What faculty are
presenting and asking for then seems frustrating and
irrelevant. Emphasizing the full learning cycle and its
contribution to the final stage of performance competence can reduce resistance to being stretched into unfamiliar territory. The full range of serious scientific
and cultural understandings then becomes more meaningful.
Such stretching can occur beyond faculty-student
exchanges when students recognize opportunitie to
encounter different types of learning trength from
students in other fields. Presumably that is one of the
main purposes for pursuing profe sional education on
a campus where liberal art major are well repre ented.
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Mingling and studying with liberal arts students presents occasions for professional students to expand
horizons. One specific opportunity, for instance, is in
discovering the moral implications of professional
decision making. Professional students have a way of
letting the technical action demands of such decisions
keep their perspectives narrow. Getting the reactions
of fellow students in other fields who are keen on reflective observation or assimilative theorizing can be
very productive-when the value of those strengths
is appreciated.

Are There Learning Needs of Faculty?
To this point, though, the application of learning
style insights is somewhat self-evident. Clearly tudent
can learn from faculty, and the profes ions from the
liberal arts. That discussion has its place when aimed
at the learning needs of students in the profe ional
programs. What about the learning ne ds of faculty?
Is there an application in particular for the learning
needs of faculty who find a comfortable intell ctual
home in the traditional liberal arts?
As suggested earlier, the e di tinction find their
biggest pay-off in team building efforts. Ba ic for that
purpose is the realization that a dominant 1 arning
style is both a strength and a weakne s. The w akn
is that other stages in the learning cycle will b pursued less well, especially a reliance i incr a ingly
placed on the dominant style.
Faculty typically have learning tyle that ar w ak r
in the final stages of practical application than in th
intermediate stages. It i a natural for th m a for
anyone else to let ta k horizon b narrow d to what
they do well. Yet the pur uit of w 11-round d full-cy 1
educational offering would call for r i tin u h Ifserving narrowness. Faculty hav a mu h of a
uing need to be stretch d into their w ak r ta
anybody el e trying to improv I arnin .
Such tretching i what pr f ion-ori nt d
can do. Tugging at oth r to ompl t th
their pecial role in th uni r it ommunit .
usually feel a legitimat ri ht to a k H w
course or exp rience mak m a bett r
manager, or nur ? Th
d
time the an w r i
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English faculty occasionally talk with engineering faculty about the educational needs
of engineering students. Is there any chance that the process might work in reverse?

tudent who e pect to tre performance comp ten
can be a timulating for liberal art faculty a it can b
for their profe ional program colleague .
In recent decades an odd phra e ha appeared in th
problem-solving vocabulary of such area of practical
affair a politics and bu ine . The ultimate put-down
for an argument that is not worth con idering an mor
is that it is "academic." Even academicians can be heard
using it. The understood meaning is that whatever
distinction is being made serves no u eful purpo e; in
practice it is irrelevant. How trange that there would
be such a ready association of academic with u eles .
What it reflects at a minimum is a popular perception
that what faculty types do usually falls short of do ing
the learning cycle. Somewhere in that usage is a message for improving faculty styles of inquiry.

D ifferences in Faculty Strengths
In comparison to students, university faculty across
disciplines would look fairly similar in their clustering of style strengths. However, within the very select
population of faculty themselves, relative differences
would undoubtedly appear on a learning style inventory. It is not unreasonable to expect those differing
strengths to follow the pattern of disciplines described
according to the undergraduate majors of the managers
studied by Kolb. Faculty in the traditional liberal arts
would tend to emphasize one or the other of the first
two stages of the cycle in their personal style, while
faculty in the professional programs would appear
strange!" in one or the other of the latter two.
As already noted, confronting those differing styles
can be very helpful in management development programs. How beneficial would such a deliberate discussion be in faculty development within a university? It
is interesting to speculate on what might emerge if a
frank exchange of perceptions of style strengths and
weaknesses were encouraged across disciplines. It is
the hope of improving their results that helps managers overcome a natural reluctance to engage in such
constructive confrontation and strength sharing. Keeping sights set on improving the prospects of having welleducated graduates might help faculty overcome a
similar reluctance.
English faculty occasionally talk with engineering
faculty about the educational needs of engineering
students. The presence of an English requirement
provides a minimal working relationship. But do engineering faculty ever get involved with their Engli h
colleagues in talking about the learning needs of Engli h
major ? The two group could expect to hare little
about the knowledge substance of that area. They predictably would also have very different tyles in under-
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od
matt
om pro
ative
. If th xchange
tr t hing
t into cont achin of th ology?
There i preced nt for a , orth
chan . A number of th ology profe or from around the country
have found them elve participating in l n thy ummer
eminar at the Harvard Bu in
chool. Th y go
there to experienc the ca m thod of learning and to
incorporate it into their own tyle . There are r ports
that they have benefited from the experience.
There is no doubt that profe ional program faculty
u e their liberal art colleague . They use them not
only to teach general education courses in the profe ional curriculum, but they al o look to their disciplines to provide early tage models and skills for
their own applied endeavors.
As profe sional programs and faculty become more
visible on university campuses, how can liberal arts
faculties use them? Their students can do more for
the university than maintain slipping enrollm ents in
general education courses. Their faculty can do more
than provide evidence of campus diversity. T h eir emphasis on completing the learning cycle can be used
as a source of creative tension. To be foun d somewhere
in that tension is the stimulus for educational improvement for everyone.
Cl

Derek
To my oldest son, already
Listening, in his room,
To the bare tree wind :rhythm
Of his growing away from me,
I am sending my father's old lies
About how the stones ar e not dead ,
How fire is a friend to count on.
I am writing on his window
In the heavy breath of aging
The embarrassing lines of love.

In the morning these deceits
Will drip into the bu sh es.
Caught in the overnight webs,
The stories will oftly buzz,
Like insects, like clocks.
Gary Fincke
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Interview
Richard Maxwell
Richard Maxwell: Someone commented la t night that your poems
seem to have been written by an old
man, at least a man older than thirtysix; that the poems are about memory, looking back. This is certainly
true of the title poem in Solstice,
where you write,
Thimble-cones crushed by winter's brief/
shadows
aren't meant for remembering. Sparrow-/
tattle,
rabbits in the pine-ruck, a field mouse
pushing a dropped maple leaf.

And then, a little later in the poemWe've got one hickory log
left to burn, and we feel the present as/
something past
lived out before it's remembered .

Explicitly or otherwise, memory is
a theme of this book. Could you
comment?
W S. DiPiero: The British painter
Francis Bacon has a phrase that he
uses, "working off one's own nervous system," by which he means absolute involvement in a moment of
creation. What stands in back of the
moment in which one is living off
nerves is memory. The poem you
read comes from both sources. It is
written off the nerves and also out
of memory. It tries to express an instant recognition of mortality, mortality understood m a communal
context.
R.M.: Your essay in The Southern
Review, "Memory and Enthusiasm,"
sets up a kind of poetics. Could you

Richard Maxwell teaches English at
Valparaiso University and is the regular
Film critic for The Cresset.
January, 1983

W. S. DiPiero: Memory and Enthusiasm

Memory includes not simply recollections of one's own life
but also the racial memory one is always trying to get at.
talk about the relation between
memory and enthusiasm, the way
you use those words?
WSD: I speak of memory as that
which is located in lived experience
- not something abstract but sensuous. Memory includes not simply
recollections of one's own life but
also the racial memory which one is
constantly trying to get at. It's what
Yeats was trying in his Byzantium
poems.
RM: How does the other term, enthusiasm, fit in?
WSD: When you are open to all the
particulars of the world and of history, you can respond simply by the
poetic equivalent of leaping up and
down and saying "ooh la la" -which
is one kind of enthusiasm.
RM: Are there any poems in Solstice
which might be the poetic equivalent
of leaping up and down?
WSD: No-because my own instincts
tell me that this mindless enthusiasm
can affect the beginnings of poetry
but do not constitute it all. I look
for the structure of enthusiasm, just
as for the structure of memory. It's
that which concerns me.
RM: Is this like Wordsworth recollecting emotion in tranquillity?
WSD: Despite his own formula,
when Wordsworth recollects things
he's not especially tranquil lots of
the times. He gets excited when he
starts thinking about his previou
visits to Tintern Abbey. At the end
of the Intimations Ode, he seem
somehow to express a full-bodied
jubilance, while not sacrificing the
knowledge he has taken away. Perhaps that's the ideal, to have that
full-bodied enthusiasm without acrificing articulation . Keat ' "To
Autumn" is perhaps a better example than anything in v ord worth.

That poem appears to come out of
nowhere and go back into it. It's almost purely celebrative, a wild naming of things. And yet at _the center
of it there is a consciousness which
orders the details. Keats really does
seem to be filled with a god. But at
the same time what he says is structured, articulate. Maybe that's the
idea.
RM: You say in a poem from Solstice
that all seeing is dramatic action.
That seems to be what we are talking
about: a conflict or maybe balance
between the physical world and
thinking.
WSD: I see things that live in extraordinary wealth, the wealth of the
world. The world can seem a fragmentary hodgepodge, gorgeou in
details, gorgeous in all its panoramas. If I'm going to write poem about
it, the poems will come out of my
own encounter with the field of vision. The point becomes to make
sense of the pattern; to que ti n th
lack of pattern; to qu tion th authorship of pattern · , ourc , origins.

W. . DiPiero was poet in residence at
Valparaiso University for several da s
during Spn·ng 1982, when this interoiew
was taped. Mr. DiPiero 's poetry and
translations from the Italian have
appeared in many journals. His recent
ol tic was issued b Porch Publications. His translation of Leopardi's
Pen i ri is available from Louisiana
State niversity Press and h · tran lati n
of Euripides's Ion, in collaboration with
William Arrowsmith, i f orthc min
from Oxford
ni ersit Press. Mr.
DiPiero current/ teaches at tan[ord
Universit .

27

RM: "Angle " ay omething like
that: it also rejects an alternate po sibility. You de cribe
a dream in which a hammerclaw of
word
jams in your throat. reminding you that
eloquence
is never its ow n reward . You have one/
choice to make:
sit fac ing a wall forever, flattered by su r-/
faces ,
or do anything else at all.

WSD: Yes: to sit facing a wall divided
by surfaces can be very nice. Quiet,
painless, tranquil. Intellectual
death.
RM: Do some poets suffer that
death?
WSD: Sure. One of the problems in a
lot of contemporary verse is an
abundant and exclusive attention
to the surfaces of experience and the
surfaces of the poem as they seek to
shimmer with those experiences.
You can call this dandyism. Dandyism is excessive attention to one's
appearance and the studious development of affectation in order to
have a recognizable identity. When
a poet becomes a dandy, he no longer pays enough attention to subject
matter, to theme.
RM: I'll present you with an argument. Many of the finest nineteenthcentury poets cultivated dandyism
and it seems to me that they did so
fruitfully. Take Byron, the broken
dandy lately on his travels. Baudelaire for that matter is a fascinating
user of dandyism. These are people
for whom dandyism is not just a superficial cultivation of appearances
but an almost necessary way of preserving identity in a world which
seems to be homogenous, blurring
over.
WSD: Sure, but what you are talking
about is dandyism as a subject rather
than dandyism simply as a mode of
writing. Byron exploits his line and
his verse in Don Juan as a way of
dramatizing the frequent humor
with which he himself regards the
role of the dandy. So what we get in
these cases is a drama of identity. By
comparison, a contemporary poet
like Mark Strand engages in a sort
of glum dandyism.

28

RM: It painful to imagin a lum
dandyi m: ther e a
lebration of
urface which ha not
n th brio
of an accompli h d dand i m and o
get the wor t of two world .
WSD: Part of the problem ma b
an ae thetic which b lie e that th
mo t inten e poetry the fine t poetry i utterl internal. It' pace
within one' own p yche that become
fascinating, so one write about
those pace . Then one ee hadows
in them and writes about the shadows. And suddenly everything that'
out there is gone.
RM: What 1s the state of American
poetry publishing right now?
WSD: They've inaugurated a national poetry series founded by James
Michener and some other rich people to allow commercial publishers
to publish books of poems. What has
happened very quickly is that it has
become a political series. The people who are asked to solicit manuscripts solicit them from friends.
The series has become suspect.
Knopf recently started a poetry series. They tend to favor poets who
have published a great deal in the
New Yorker. That is, they tend to
publish rather harmless, innocuous,
descriptive poets who are New Yorkers or known in New York.
RM: Where does the good poetry
publishing come from?
WSD: You take it where you can get
it. You can't generalize and say, well,

rk i
rrupt w mu t look
uni r it pr
. Th y do
mu h undi tingui h d work,
mor . What about mall
pr
? It a qu ti n of pi king
and h
in . Th futur of po try
publi hin 1 m o man different
kind of hand . I know that most
univ r it pre
do not mak their
own deci ion . Th r ely on outside
reader . It' po ible for omeone to
writ a fine book of poems, which is
then sent out to John Frederick
Nim [editor of Poetry] and Nims
might ay ' Thi poetry is no good
becau e it doe n 't have any images
in it. It's not hard. It's not crisp. It's
not tough. It's not clear, blah, blah,
blah." So the university press writes
back to the poet and says, "Sorry, we
can't publish your book-our expert says it's no good." One person
says no and it's no.
RM: You're describing a situation
in which the publishing world itself
is almost incredibly fragmented and
in fact so are the standards for poetry. Have there been times in the
modern world when there have been
so many standards for kinds of
poems?
WSD: I don't know any precedentnothing that matches it. It's partly
because of differences in wealth and
in magnitude in the publishing industry these days. It's also because
public taste has been pretty bad most
of the time. Let me give an example.
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William
arlo William , whose
imitator are now b ing published
by trade publi her , wa fifty-five
years old b fore he publi hed a book
of poem for which he himself did
not have to pay. He did not have a
publisher who would make a commitment to publishing his work on a
regular ba i until he was almost
sixty. He had a kind of public identity as the bad boy of American
writers who also happened to be a
physician and didn't have enough
sense to move to New York where
he could have been successful. That
was the public perception of Williams, who wrote some of the great
poems of our times.
RM: Therefore it's the happy few
who have time to make the decisions
themselves who are going to be
reading poetry in a way that means
anything. This is possibly an important point because there is such
a tradition in America of saying that
literature should be open to a vast
reading public. But you don't see
this happening?
WSD: No, I don't. After all, we live
in a prose civilization. All the skills
that are taught from kindergarten
on up are prose skills. Poetry is
taught as a highly technical discipline. You have to have technical
skills, which are difficult to acquire,
if you're going to read a poem. All
this baloney is fed to kids from the
time they are very young. And later
you are not taught to read poetry;
you are taught to interpret it.

We live in a prose
civilization. All the
skills that are taught
from kindergarten on
up a re prose skills.
RM: How do you teach poetry?
WSD: Many of my students are not
poetry readers. So I have them read
a lot and I have them talk in detail
under interrogation by me about the
poems they have read. I urge them
to allow themselves to be delighted
by poems before anything else. But
you know- I think a twenty-yearold college student can take up, say,
hort stories by William Gass, a book
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that really does issue from the apparent revolutions of modernism,
and enjoy that book: hear the different voices in it. Students who read
As I Lay Dying for the first time get
thirty pages into it and have some
sense of what's going on. That is
partly because of the instincts we
develop as readers. All prose instincts.
RM: What is a poetry instinct?
WSD: First of all, to be able to hear a
line: to have some sense of the music
and structure of a line.
RM: How do you hear a line?
WSD: This is going to be difficult.
The music that I hear in my head, I
can never get that voice. However,
listen to a very short poem, "Odysseus":
There is no world
to speak of, no end
of home or country .
Every breath
a going. A gull
cries in my dream
of one hundred ways.
She waits, silent
sea-foam wife.
The wind, no world ,
speaks for me.

When I hear that poem I know that
underneath is a line built on two
heavy stresses. I try to pick up in the
structure something of the fatefulness of Odysseus, a man who is
destined.
RM: What kind of audience can an
American poet expect?
WSD: Every writer I know has one
or two friends to whom he shows his
work and whose opinions he values.
They constitute his audience. He
may not have a much larger audience than that, and if he does he may
not be aware that he has it. It's that
small audience which is first of all
important, and it comprises a community. Montale says that his favorite metaphor for the distribution of
poetry is the message in the bottl .
You have no idea who's going to
find the bottle, nor if he can read ,
nor if he cares to read poetry. If he
does, you're going to reach omeon .
RM: Seeing isolation through that
metaphor put a rather differ nt
light on it. Thank you for talking
with us.
Cl
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Language and
Reality-Part II

The Sad Gay World
Of Torch Song Trilogy
John Steven Paul
From a platform that fairly float
in the darkness above the stage, th
lady blues singer suffers through the
last several strains of her torch song.
The lighting lowly draw a figure
out of the darknes : another inger,
one of ample fle h stuff d into a
tawdry sheath tudd d with equin ,
one with mas ive head w dged in a
satiny cloche, one putting on a fa
at a lighted vanity. Th voic , a
basso rasp , a buzz aw crackin
smart-mouth remark throu h
pursed and flaming red lip id ntifies the gowned one a a man . rnold Beckoff- h of th b d
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Torch Song Trilogy is strong stuff. The author does nothing to modify his material
to make it easy for audiences. But neither does he sensationalize or titillate.
of which are forced out of him under
the intense and ince sant pre ure
which is, according to playwright
Harvey Fierstein, the e sence of the
homosexual experience in a predominantly heterosexual culture.
Torch Song Trilogy is strong stuff.
Fierstein does nothing to modify his
material to make it easy for audiences. And why should he? Why
should any part of human experience be represented as something it
is not? At the same time, it must be
said that Fierstein has not exploited
or exaggerated his material for the
sake of sensationalism or titillation;
though the play has much to do with
love and sex, it is not explicit, and
the lights are turned off at potential1y offensive moments. Still, the
heterosexual playgoer with "traditional" values and lifestyle must be
patient during the first quarter-hour
of Torch Song-the characters and
the situation are discomforting, even
extremely so. But that patience is
rewarded with insight, enlightenment if you will, as Harvey Fierstein
gradually builds trust with his audience. Besides, it's a very entertaining show.
The first play of the trilogy, The
Internati"onal Stud (named for a Manhattan gay bar), is a fairly typical
story of a twenty-four year old in
search of true and lasting love instead of a series of sexual episodes.
When Ed, a likely candidate for a
long-term relationship, makes his
way to Virginia Hamm's (Arnold's
stage name) dressing room after a
show and proffers his affection, Arnold falls hopefully in love with
him. Now, Ed is the all-American
type: all blonde-haired, blue-eyed
intelligence, tastefully-developed,
non-intimidating musculature, and
sexual ambivalence bordering on
confusion. Ed doesn't know what he
wants, but he'll walk over anyone
and everyone to get it.
Ed makes friends and then love
with Arnold, but he keeps the closet
door wide open behind him and
30

him elf pr pared to t p back in
hould the ituation call for it. Wh n
he meet a girl named Laurel Ed
renege on hi promi e to mold
and with one phon call relegate
their relation hip to Arnold' lon
list of brief and ad encounter . Arnold' old wound i reopened.
In order to hasten the earring
proce s, Arnold drifts over to the
International
tud with hi pal
Murray. There is a front room and
a back room at this place. The front
room is for picking up, the back
room for backing up-a particularly
sad and degrading form of sexual
gratification during which the partners never see each other's face. Arnold looks for love even in this type
of encounter that, by its very nature,
can only be emotionally traumatic.
He is so pathetically naive that
when he discovers his backroom
lover has departed without a word,
his deep hurt is mixed with genuine
astonishment.
When Ed returns to the dressing
room after a space of several months,
he finds Arnold in a thornily selfprotective posture-sarcastic, derisive, and mean. While never confessing his love for Arnold, Ed asks
for another chance at a relationship.
Arnold is fully aware of the pain he
is inviting; his compulsion to love
fights with his fear of not being
loved. And, finally, he lets Ed drive
him home.
The International Stud, then, establishes the identity of the central
character and the rhythm of Torch
Song Trilogy. The rhythm of Arnold's existence is rejection, retreat,
repair, return, rejection, retreat,
and so on. He has come to know it
so well he is almost reassured by its,.
regularity. Emotional pain is Ar- ' '
nold's friend; the torch song, a celebration of love-pain, is his emblem.
For the first play, Fierstein combines the smart-mouthed alternation
of insult and comebacks a form
perfected by Neil Simon in plays
like The Odd Couple, with the epi-

di
homo

tru tur of a abar t. Th

ual

tionalized hi confu ion a bi exuality. Laurel, Ed's girl, ha been
through a numb r of affairs including two with married men and two
(previously) with men who realized
their bisexual orientation while they
were involved with her. Finally
there is Alan, who is eighteen years
old, exceptionally handsome, boyishly rugged, a hustler-and Arnold's steady.
In Fugue, Fierstein mixes these
characters and relationships like
musical figures. Indeed, the action
is accompanied by a string ensemble.
The play takes place in an enormous
round bed sloped toward the audience and strewn with Easter-eggcolored bedding. In the pairing and
shuffling, each character dialogs
with each of the others. The subject
of the dialog is the rights and responsibilities of lovers to one another. The climax of the play comes
when Ed and Alan engage in more
than dialog. Afterward, Arnold and
Laurel are left to pick up and ana1yze the pieces. It is abundantly
clear that the gay former lover and
the straight fiancee have one important thing in common: pain.
At the end of Fugue, Arnold and
Alan have defined their relationship and signed a contract to certify
their commitment to one another.
Ed and Laurel have gotten married.
Five years separate Fugue from the
beginning of the third play, Widows
and Children First!. Ed and Laurel
have separated; Arnold is without
Alan. Alan's murder by a gang of
youths with baseball bats seems to
have been a product of anti-homosexual bigotry. There is a new character, David, a fifteen-year-old former battered child and veteran of
three different foster home . Da id
The Cresset

Torch Song is concerned with the search for commonalities, not only among its
characters, but also between the gay world on stage and the straight world beyond.
i gay. H ha b n plac d with Arnold und r a p ial program which
matche homo xual childr n with
homo exual adoptive parents. Ed,
on the r bound from Laurel, is
spending a few day with Arnold
and David and the boy b gins to
view Arnold' former lover as a potential father. At pre ent, Arnold,
David, and Ed are anxiously awaiting the imminent arrival of Arnold's
Jewish mother, a widow from Miami
Beach.
Ma Beckoff carries her cognizance
of Arnold's homosexuality like the
weight of the world. She is almost
involuntarily derisive toward her
effeminate son and masterfully
adept at shifting her burden to her
son's guilt-ridden shoulders. The
perennial question of this motherson relationship is whether Ma can
come to accept Arnold's lifestyle
and, more importantly, the self
from which that lifestyle naturally
flows. In Widows the question is
posed in connection with Arnold's
plan to adopt David. Ma, who has
never conceded the possibility of a
domestic arrangement between men
equivalent to one between a man
and a woman, is appalled at the idea.
That a social service agency could
sanction such a plan is a sign to her
of the craziness of the modern world.
To air their differences, Ma and
Arnold resort to an apparently
long-standing Beckoff tradition, the
pitched verbal battle.
Despite their strong feelings
about David, the Beckoff argument
centers on the issue of who has the
right to more grief over the loss of a
spouse. Arnold contends that his
mother had it relatively easy when
after thirty-five years of marriage
her husband died of an illness in a
"nice clean hospital ," while Alan
wa murdered in the street after a
brief five years of conjugality. Ma
pits contempt at her on's comparion of his lo with hers. Their position having hardened, the breach
b tween them is unbridgeable, and
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Ma prepares for an immediate return flight to Florida.
But a farewell interview with
David arouses her deep maternal
feelings. She senses the boy's desperate need for a parent and recognizes Arnold's need to parent-a
need similar to her own. From her
perception of that common need,
Ma progresses to some understanding of Arnold's loss and, finally,
shares with her son her experience
as a widow. Then, sadly, she leaves
the three men to themselves.

Deeper than the deepest
differences that
distinguish groups of
people from one another
lie fundamental human
needs, pains, and desires.
Ma leaves Arnold's apartment
acutely aware of the variances between her son's world and her own.
Yet she has glimpsed some fundamental human commonalities in
those variant worlds. Deeper than
the deepest differences that distinguish groups of humans from one
another lie similarities such as the
pain of rejection and loss, the need
to care and to be cared for, and the
desire for a link between personal
identity and social entity. Torch Song
Trilogy is concerned with the search
for commonalities, not only among
the dramatis personae, but also between the world of Harvey Fierstein's play and those members of
the audience who have more in common with Laurel and Ma Beckoff
than with Ed, David, and Arnold.
Torch Song illustrates one of th
difficultie of di covering commonalitie between group who realities seem absolutely di parate. Like
Brian Friel in hi play about th
Iri h and English of the 1 30 Translations ( ee Cresset, D cemb r, 19 2),
Fier tein root the confli t b t
n
homo exual and hetero
ual mmumt1 in languag i
. In addition to oth r pr rogati
th d m-

inant community retains official
control over the language and resents its expropriation by deviant
groups. Permission to use certain
words - homosexual, queer, faggot - is
granted. But other words, such as
husband, wife, marriage, mother, father,
family, home, and widow become
words to fight over.
One comes away from a performance of Torch Song Trilogy with the
conviction that a significant barrier
between homosexual and heterosexual could be broken down were
problems in the signification of underlying commonalities solved. B cause the theatre is human character
in action, it has always and can continue to reveal the univer als underlying apparently di parate bit
of human experience.
The theatre depends for ucce ful
character revelation on the intimat
relationship between actor and audience. Frankly, I did not want to be
intimate with Arnold Beckoff!

are lik
heart:
parati n ,
fatal. Fatal t

Campus
Diary
CJCJCJc::JCJCJD
CJCJCJCJCJCJCJ
CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ
CJCJCJCJCJCJCJ
CJCJCJCJCJCJCJ
111111111111111111111111111
111111111111••11111111
11111111•1111111111111111
llll llll llll 111111111111111
111111111111111111111111111
A Cloud of Witnesses
John Strietelmeier
One of the sad things about
growing older is that from time to
time one looks back over the years
and realizes that he has lost touch
with too many friends who were
once important to him. It is thus
a special grace when something
comes along- a reunion, perhaps,
or a visit, or a book of memoirsto refresh memories that had grown
dim of people who, though not forgotten, had not been in one's recollection for quite some time.
In my own case, some of my happiest and proudest memories are of
the old Lutheran Human Relations
crowd of the early 1950s. Standing
as I did on the fringe of this crowd,
I had no doubt at all that I was on
the level of eye contact with greatness. Walter Heyne often waved
when he walked past me. Clem Sabourin knew me by name. Martin
Nees once sat at the same table with
me. Tommy Coates smiled once at
something I said. Les Frerking shook
hands with me. Most remarkably
and fatefully of all, t. Andrew
Schulze took me as a kind of disciple and, for the next thirty years
kept prodding me with gentle reminders that I had been baptized
and ought to show an occasional
sign of it.
Andy went to Heaven last pring
and Margaret, his wife and alter
32

ego, hortl thereafter. And then,
in Jul I got a little pap rback book
from the Reverend amuel L. Hoard.
(Almost a Layman. By amuel L.
Hoard. L
Church upplie 109
Allamenda Drive, Lakeland Florida
33803. 63 pages. Paperback. 4.95
plus 1.05 shipping.) am, who is
now an M.S.W. and a D.D. and a
retired officer in the Chaplains
Corps, was one of us hero-wor hipping young folk out on the fringe
of LHRAA. I was always a little
bit in awe of him because he seemed
so much more adult and secure and
sophisticated than I. Unfortunately,
we did not see enough of each other
to become close friends. But in that
early LHRAA network there was a
tie of love and respect that bound
pretty tightly, even across the geographical and psychological distances imposed by our callings.
Sam's book is no literary masterpiece. And while to me it is well
worth the price, it probably
wouldn't be to most people. It is,
in some ways, a story we have heard
so often that we are tired of it, the
story of a bright, ambitious black
boy growing up in a white church
and eventually, after many rebuffs
and discouragements, becoming a
pastor in that church, only to find
that, in spite of his ordination, he
was still "almost a layman" in the
racist thinking of many of the
Lutheran Christians he was called
to serve. Almost any black pastor
in a white, mainline denomination
would have a similar story to tell.
But Sam tells his story well. And
if the experiences of his life have
left him bitter he certainly conceals it very well. Indeed, he can
even ee the humor in events and
circumstance that many of us would
surely judge more harshly. He does,
of course, recount incident which
remind us that Christian people
and their leaders really are, a Luther aid at the ame time aint

and inn r . But h i
n rou al o
in naming tho
who encouraged
him on th wa and, wh n nee ary,
championed hi cau e again t fearful and mi taken brethren.
God never leave Him elf without
witne se . Whenever the Church
find itself in a real crisis, He literally compa se it about with a
great cloud of witnesses. And so it
was in those critical days when the
civil rights movement left the Church
no choice but to testify or to deny. ,
Almost a Layman contains a list of
contemporary saints and confessors
which would make a worthy addendum to Hebrews 11: Otis Finley,
Elmer Foelber, Paul Amt, Louis
Dorn, Bob Epp, Arno Scholz, Arnold Krentz, Erwin Kurth, John
Stach, Ralph Moellering, Marmaduke Carter, Ralph Egolf, William
Puder, Richard Neuhaus, Art Simon,
Paul Simon. And these names suggest others who are not mentioned
in this book, but who in those decisive days "stoood at Armageddon
and battled for the Lord." Some of
them, two decades later, would find
themselves on opposite sides of the
liberal-conservative fence, and thus
unhappily estranged from each
other. But even in that estrangement the memory of happier days
helped greatly to preserve a unity
of the spirit in the bond of peace.
I knew some contemporaries of
Sam's, black Lutheran pastors who
had not been fortunate enough to
find a Paul Amt or an Elmer Foelber or an Andy Schulze or an 0. P.
Kretzmann to run interference for
them. Some of them had remarkable
gifts, both of the intellect and of
the spirit, but they were never given
the opportunity to develop them.
They, too, could write a book. And
maybe they should-if only to remind u that, while the Spirit i
alway and powerfully at work in
the Church, the world i there too
with all its corro ive power.
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